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Abstract
We analyse how neighbourhood ethnic diversity and segregation affect adolescents’
social participation in England. We distinguish between participation in ‘purposeful ac-
tivities’ - such as sports and volunteering - and hanging around with friends. We suggest
a novel identification strategy to address the problem of endogeneity of ethnic diversity
and segregation. We find that ethnic diversity decreases hanging around, while ethnic
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Britain has become increasingly concerned about whether the coexistence of different eth-
nicities may affect the quality of social interaction. Data from the MORI’s Issues Index show
that, since the early 2000s, the quality of the relations among different ethnic groups has been
perceived as a top issue faced by Britain, often scoring higher than other salient issues such as
the state of the economy or the National Health System.1 This paper investigates the roots
of these concerns for England. It studies how social participation of 14/15 years old young
people is affected by the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood where adolescents live.
We pay particular attention to the role of geography in shaping social participation. Our
measures of neighbourhood ethnic composition are ethnic diversity and segregation at the lo-
cal authority district (henceforth ‘district’) level.2 District ethnic diversity does not consider
the spatial distribution of ethnicities within the district. This spatial distribution is captured
by district ethnic segregation. In our case, district ethnic segregation captures how ethnicities
are distributed into wards within the district. To define social participation we distinguish
‘purposeful activities’ (e.g., playing sports, taking part in political activities or community
work, joining youth clubs) from ‘hanging around with friends’.3 We describe the effect of dis-
trict ethnic composition on the demand for social activities by proposing a simple explanatory
model where purposeful activities take place in the district and hanging around with friends
takes place in the ward. We test its predictions using the ‘Longitudinal Study of Young People
in England’ (LSYPE).
Studying the determinants of social participation is important. Social participation is
an objective measure of social capital (Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000;
1Ipsos MORI interviews a representative sample of around 1,000 18+ people in the UK about the most
important issues faced by the country. No pre-defined answers are provided.
2Districts are identified by the first 4 digits of the Office for National Statistics coding system. At the time
of our data there were 354 districts in England: metropolitan districts (36), non-metropolitan districts (239),
London Boroughs (33, i.e., City of London, Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Bexley, Brent, Bromley, Cam-
den, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey, Harrow, Havering,
Hillingdon, Hounslow, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Kingston upon Thames, Lambeth, Lewisham, Mer-
ton, Newham, Redbridge, Richmond upon Thames, Southwark, Sutton, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest,
Wandsworth, Westminster), and unitary authorities (46). Districts were composed on average by 23 electoral
wards: the spatial units used for the election of local government councillors, identified by the first 6 digits of
the ONS coding system.
3Purposeful activities are often referred to as ‘positive activities’ (e.g., DfES, 2003). We prefer the definition
of ‘purposeful activities’, as it only implies these activities have a specific goal, without making any judgment
on their desirability.
2
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005).4 Not all forms of social participation are equal. Participa-
tion in purposeful activities at a young age predicts many positive outcomes in adolescence
and adulthood. Purposeful activities improve cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Broh, 2002;
Hansen et al., 2003; Del Boca et al., 2017), educational attainment (Long and Caudill, 1991;
Barron et al., 2000; Eide and Ronan, 2001; Lipscomb, 2007; Lechner, 2009; Pfeifer and Cor-
nelißen, 2010; Rees and Sabia, 2010; Stevenson, 2010; Felfe et al., 2016) and labour market
outcomes (Long and Caudill, 1991; Barron et al., 2000; Kuhn and Weinberger, 2005; Hender-
son et al., 2006; Lechner, 2009; Stevenson, 2010; Weinberger, 2014; Lechner and Sari, 2015;
Deming, 2017; Lechner and Downward, 2017). Hanging around with friends is often claimed
to be associated with undesirable outcomes, such as drunkenness and disorders (DfES, 2006).5
However, we are not aware of any systematic analysis of hanging around with friends, or other
social activities with no specific purpose.
The paper fills this gap in the literature by drawing attention on the phenomenon of hang-
ing around. We believe this is important. In appendix A we discuss the characteristics and
the potential consequences of hanging around. Most young people hang around with friends
at least once a week. Young people’s hanging around decreases adults’ well-being. For young
people, hanging around with friends is associated with lower human capital accumulation,
higher involvement in risky behaviours and more close friends in adulthood. We use propen-
sity score techniques to claim these associations -particularly those on risky behaviours and
number of close friends- are likely to be at least partially causal. For comparison, appendix A
also shows purposeful activities are associated with -and possibly cause- higher human capital
accumulation and more close friends in adulthood.
A growing literature in economics claims ethnic diversity discourages social participation
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Charles and Kline, 2006).6 This litera-
4Social capital has been shown to predict a number of key outcomes (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005), in-
cluding economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), financial development (Glaeser
et al., 2002), and health (Folland, 2007; Rocco et al., 2014).
5Hanging around on street corners was an antisocial behaviour under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act.
6A negative effect of ethnic diversity has been found for other indicators of social capital like: trust (Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Pennant, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Leigh, 2006;
Putnam, 2007), number of friends (Putnam, 2007). Moreover, ethnic diversity has been found to be correlated
with: economic and institutional performance of countries (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Luttmer, 2001; Vigdor, 2004;
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ture typically assumes individuals derive greater utility from forming ethnically homogeneous
groups. As in ethnically diverse areas the probability of making a friend of the same ethnicity
is lower than in ethnically homogeneous ones, ethnic diversity results in a decrease of social
interaction. Studies on the effect of segregation are limited in number and lead to mixed
conclusions. Ethnic segregation has been found to increase the willingness to contribute to
local public goods (La Ferrara and Mele, 2007), but also to erode generalised trust (Uslaner,
2011, 2012). To our knowledge, the effect of ethnic segregation on social participation has
never been explicitly studied.7
The paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the effect of
neighbourhood ethnic composition on social participation. First, it focuses on young people,
as evidence suggests adolescence is when relational skills are formed (Cunha and Heckman,
2008; Cunha et al., 2010) and social participation in adolescence predicts human capital accu-
mulation, risky behaviours, future sociability and labour market outcomes (see appendix A).
Second, it distinguishes between different forms of social participation, thus accounting for
the quality of young people’s interaction. Third, it provides the first attempt of modelling the
effect of segregation (in addition to ethnic diversity) on social participation, by emphasising
the geographical level where hanging around and purposeful activities take place. This is par-
ticularly meaningful for young people, who are more restricted in how far they can travel from
home, compared to adults. Finally, the paper addresses the problem of the potential endo-
geneity of neighbourhood ethnic diversity and segregation with respect to social participation
in a number of ways, including by proposing new instruments based on historical events and
legislative acts which shaped the sorting of migrants within England.
We find that district ethnic diversity decreases hanging around, while district ethnic seg-
regation increases it. The effects of district ethnic diversity and segregation on purposeful
activities are weak or null. The results are robust to alternative empirical specifications. As
hanging around is widely perceived as an undesirable behaviour, we conclude that ethnic di-
Alesina et al., 2015), firm productivity and innovation (Bo¨heim et al., 2014; Parrotta et al., 2014), number of
political jurisdictions (Alesina et al., 2004).
7Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) discuss a potential effect of ethnic segregation (on top of ethnic diversity)
on social participation, but acknowledge that their analysis ‘does not deal directly with segregation’.
4
versity does not have detrimental effects on teenagers’ social participation. Therefore, policies
limiting migration in the attempt of preserving ethnic homogeneity are not desirable. De-
segregation policies and policies improving the supply of purposeful activities are likely to be
more beneficial.
1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.1 Data
The main data we use are from the the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England
(LSYPE), a cohort study containing detailed information for approximately 15,000 pupils
living in England and born between 1st September 1989 and 31st August 1990. The LSYPE
is a two-stage probability sample with schools as primary sampling units and students within
schools as secondary sampling units.8 This paper is based on the first wave of the data,
collected in 2004 when the respondents were 14/15 years old (year 9 at school).
Additional data are added to the LSYPE. Data from the 2001 Population Census (the
closest census data to wave one of LSYPE) are used to compute indices of district ethnic
diversity and segregation and to construct controls at the district level used in the robustness
checks.9 Districts have been chosen to indicate neighbourhoods as they are responsible for
cultural and recreational functions, and thus are the relevant geographical level for looking
at social participation. Moreover, with a population ranging from approximately 300,000 to
1,000,000 people (with even large cities like Birmingham or Leeds being formed by a single
8Maintained schools are stratified by deprivation level (measured as number of pupils receiving free school
meal). Deprived schools are over-sampled and so are ethnic minority students. Independent schools are
stratified by GCSE results in 2003, boarding status and gender of the students. Pupil Referral Units (PRU)
are a stratum of their own. The selection probability of both independent schools and PRUs is proportional
to the number of pupils aged 13 enrolled in the institution. Children educated at home are excluded from the
sample and so are children attending very small schools (with fewer than 10 pupils for the maintained sector
and fewer than 6 for the independent sector), boarders and children who are in England just for education
purposes. Response rate at wave one is 74% (66% full interviews and 9% partial interviews).
9Census data report the raw number of people living in each ward classified by ethnic group, which we
aggregate into coarser categories, as in Berthoud et al. (2009). Using the LSYPE to extract information on
the area where respondents live (including the indices of ethnic diversity and segregation) is not a viable
strategy, because of potential non-coverage and non-response bias, and because any geographical aggregation
small enough to be defined as ‘neighbourhood’ has a very small sample size. For the use of survey data based
indices, see: Carrington and Troske (1997); Jenkins et al. (2008); Rathelot (2012); Allen et al. (2015).
5
district), districts are likely to cover the area where most of the social participation takes
place. Finally, weather data (monthly millimetres of rainfall and hours of sun) from the ‘UK
met office’ are added to account for whether conditions.10
1.2 Measuring Ethnic Diversity and Segregation
District ethnic diversity is measured by the ‘fractionalisation’ (or ‘fragmentation’) index, as
in Easterly and Levine (1997); Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Alesina et al. (2003); Ashraf
and Galor (2013); Bo¨heim et al. (2014); Parrotta et al. (2014).
Definition 1 (F index). The fractionalisation index for district j (Fj) is defined as:
Fj = 1−
∑
k
s2kj, where skj is the share of ethnic group k over the population of district j.
Fj is constructed as 1 - the Herfindahl-Hirschman (1964) index and can be interpreted as the
probability two individuals randomly drawn from the population of district j belong to two
different ethnic groups. Fj ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating high diversity.
District ethnic segregation is measured by the ‘Duncan and Duncan segregation index’, as
in Duncan and Duncan (1955); Cutler and Gleaser (1997); Cutler et al. (1999).
Definition 2 (D index). The Duncan and Duncan segregation index is defined as:
Dj =
1
2
Wj∑
w=1
| mwj
Mj
− bwj
Bj
|, where mwj and bwj are, respectively, the number of people in the
ethnic minority group and in the White British group living in ward w=1,.., Wj. Mj and Bj
are, respectively, the number of people in the ethnic minority group and in the White British
group in district j, and Wj is the number of wards in district j.
Dj can be interpreted as a share of people belonging to one of the ethnic groups of district j
that should move to another ward within district j (without being replaced) in order to make
10These data are collected monthly from 37 UK meteo stations (Aberporth, Armagh, Ballypatrick For-
est, Bradford, Braemar, Camborne, Cambridge, Cardiff Bute Park, Chivenor, Cwmystwyth, Dunstaffnage,
Durham, Eastbourne, Eskdalemuir, Heathrow, Hurn, Lerwick, Leuchars, Lowesoft, Manston, Nairn, Newton
Rigg, Oxford, Paisley, Ringway, Ross-on-Wye, Shawbury, Sheffield, Southampton, Stornoway Airport, Sutton
Bonington, Tiree, Valley, Waddington, Whitby, Wick Airport, Yeovilton). Each LSYPE respondent is assigned
the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the interview month. Missing weather
data are imputed by chained equation imputation (Raghunathan et al., 2001) using as predictors maximum
and minimum temperature, days of frost, millimetres of rainfall and hours of sun for each area and month,
plus their values in the previous and in the subsequent month.
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ward ethnic diversity equal to district ethnic diversity. Dj ranges from 0 to 1, with higher
values indicating high segregation.
Figure 1: District Ethnic Diversity and Segregation
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Note: Dashed lines indicate the minimum, maximum and the median values for each index. N=313 (districts
included in the analysis). Census data. Pairwise correlation: 0.275.
The F index and the D index capture two different aspects of district ethnic composition.
For a given positive level of the F index, the D index can take a wide range of values in the
interval [0,1]. Figure 1 plots district ethnic segregation against district ethnic diversity for the
districts included in our main analysis. Given levels of district ethnic diversity are generally
associated with a wide range of levels of district ethnic segregation.
1.3 Measuring Social Participation
To measure purposeful activities and hanging around we use two LSYPE questions asking
young people about the activities they have carried out when not at school in the four weeks
before the interview. The first question lists a set of activities including: sport, playing an
instrument, going to the cinema/theater/concert, or partying. The second question lists activ-
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ities implying an engagement in the community (e.g., going to youth clubs, doing community
work) and two forms of ‘hanging around’ (near home and in the city center).
We measure participation in purposeful activities through an indicator (PA) equal to one
if the respondent reports carrying out at least one activity among: playing sport, taking part
in political activities, going to youth clubs, doing community work. PA is zero otherwise.
Two types of activities are excluded from PA: i) those not necessarily requiring interaction
among people, such as playing a musical instrument, going to the cinema/theater and going
to a concert, ii) those not necessarily ‘positive’ in the definition of DfES (2006), e.g., partying,
dancing, watching a football match, going to a night club, going to the pub, going to the
amusement arcade and playing snooker, as they may be associated with risky behaviours,
like fights, drunkenness or illegal substance use. Our measure of hanging around is ‘hanging
around near home’. It is measured through an indicator (HA) equal to one if the respondent
reports ‘hanging around near home’, and zero otherwise. ‘Hanging around in the city center’ is
excluded because it might mean something completely different for young people from different
areas of the city.11
Figure 2 plots district level prevalence of PA and HA against district ethnic diversity and
segregation. HA decreases with district ethnic diversity (see top left panel). The share of
young people hanging around drops from 60% in the least ethnically diverse districts to less
than 40% in the most diverse ones. HA does not seem to vary with district ethnic segregation
(see top right panel). No relationship between PA and either measure of district ethnic
composition seems to exist, with the average share of those who participate in PA being just
above 60% (see bottom panels).
The bivariate relationships in figure 2 must be interpreted with caution, as they can
be partially due to respondents’ characteristics differing by districts ad also affecting social
participation. For example, the effects of household economic deprivation might be mistakenly
interpreted as effects of neighbourhood ethnic composition (see Letki, 2008; Fieldhouse and
Cutts, 2010; Sturgis et al., 2011). This issue is addressed in table 1, where social participation
11Hanging around in the city center is analysed in section 6.
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Figure 2: District Ethnic Composition and Social Participation
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HA=1 if the respondent reports hanging around with friends near home. PA=1 if the respondent reports
carrying out at least one activity among: playing sport, taking part in political activities, going to youth
clubs, doing community work. Census and LSYPE data. LSYPE data are weighted. N=274 (excludes
districts with less than 5 respondents). Just districts included in the analysis have been plotted.
is broken down by quintiles of total gross household income.12 Participation in PA increases
with household income. The share of those participating in PA is 73% among respondents
in the top quintile of household income and only 59% among those in the bottom quintile.
These results are driven by participation in sports. In contrast, participation in HA is pretty
constant within quintiles of household income. A full set of descriptive statistics for the sample
we use can be found in table B.1 in appendix B.
12In LSYPE wave one, total household income is available as a banded variable, with band width increasing
with income. Missing values have been inputed my chain equation (Raghunathan et al., 2001).
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Table 1: Participation in Social Activities (by Income Quintiles)
Political Community Youth
PA HA Sport activities work clubs
Income quintile Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
All 0.567 0.657 0.572 0.017 0.045 0.045
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Bottom quintile 0.560 0.586 0.492 0.021 0.045 0.045
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Second quintile 0.583 0.601 0.507 0.015 0.040 0.040
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Third quintile 0.582 0.655 0.568 0.018 0.044 0.044
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Fourth quintile 0.583 0.696 0.615 0.018 0.049 0.049
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Top quintile 0.526 0.730 0.655 0.014 0.047 0.047
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: LSYPE wave 1, weighted. The sample is the same used in the empirical analysis discussed in section 3. Income is total
gross household income. Standard errors in paretheses.
2 Explanatory Model
Our formalisation of the effect of district ethnic diversity and segregation on HA and PA
is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that HA and PA have a different
geographical scope. HA is likely to take place near home, as made explicit by the wording of
the question we use to measure it. We refer to the ward where young people live as the space
where HA takes place. Appendix A shows HA generally takes place near home and suggests
this assumption is plausible in our case. PA is likely to take place in an area broader than
the ward. We refer to the district where young people live as the space where PA take place.
The reasons for this choice are discussed in section 1.1.
The second assumption is that young people care about the ethnicity of those participating
in HA and PA and have a preference for people of their own ethnic group. This preference for
one’s own ethnic group, at the core of many explanations of social interaction (e.g., Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2000; Charles and Kline, 2006), has been documented for adolescents by
Currarini et al. (2009). In appendix A we use information about the ethnicity of the friends
of LSYPE respondents, to claim this assumption is plausible in our case.
Our explanatory model focuses on the demand side of social participation. At least in
the short run, the supply of social activities is given. The role of supply side is discussed
in section 7. Consider a district, divided in two wards and assume young people come in
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two types: Greens (g) and Purples (p). There are two social activities: HA (taking place
in the ward) and PA (taking place in the district). The young people decide whether to
participate in HA and PA based on an expected utility that depends on their expectations
about the ethnicity of the participants in the activity. We assume young people approximate
the ethnicity of the participants in HA (PA) with the ethnicity of the young people in the
ward (district).13
Consider Greens and Purples in ward 1. Their expected utility for HA can be written as:
EUg1i(HA) =
ng1 + τHAnp1
ng1 + np1
+ αHAi (1)
EUp1i(HA) =
np1 + τHAng1
ng1 + np1
+ αHAi (2)
ng1 and np1 are the numbers of, respectively, Greens and Purples in ward 1. τHA is a parameter
∈ [0, 1] indicating the level of tolerance for the other ethnicity when young people do HA. If
τHA is 0, young people only derive utility from participants of their own ethnicity; if τHA
is 1, young people’s utility does not depend on the ethnicity of the participants. Finally,
αHAi is a idiosyncratic parameter, capturing individual preferences and costs related to HA.
αHAi ∈ [−α¯HAi,α¯HAi], and α¯HAi is such that at least one person is always willing to do HA.
Defining ng2 = Ng−ng1 and np2 = Np−np1, the expected utility of HA for Greens and Purples
in ward 2 can be written in terms of the number of Greens and Purples in the district (Ng and
Np, respectively) and the number of Greens and Purples in ward 1 (ng1 and np1, respectively):
EUg2i(HA) =
Ng − ng1 + τHA(Np − np1)
Ng − ng1 +Np − np1 + αHAi (3)
EUp2i(HA) =
Np − np1 + τHA(Ng − ng1)
Ng − ng1 +Np − np1 + αHAi (4)
The expected utility of PA depends on the ethnicity of the young people participating in
PA, approximated by the ethnicity of the young people in the district. Therefore, it is the
13We believe this assumption is not unreasonable in the case of young people, as strategic behavior fully
develops in adulthoods. In this respect, Czermak et al. (2016) find that only 40% of adolescents aged 10 to
17 years are strategic thinkers.
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same for young people from the same ethnic group, but living in different wards. The expected
utility of PA, for Greens and Purples, can be written:
EUg1i(PA) = EUg2i(PA) =
Ng + τPANp
Ng +Np
+ αPAi (5)
EUp1i(PA) = EUp2i(PA) =
Np + τPANg
Ng +Np
+ αPAi (6)
where τPA is a parameter ∈ [0, 1] indicating the level of tolerance for the other ethnicity when
young people do PA. τPA can be greater, equal or smaller than τHA. αPAi ∈ [−α¯PAi,α¯PAi] is
a idiosyncratic parameter, capturing individual preferences and costs related to PA, and such
that at least one person is always willing to do PA.
To guide the interpretation of our empirical results, we study how the incentives of doing
HA and PA change when i) district ethnic segregation changes (with district ethnic diversity
constant) ii) district ethnic diversity changes (with district ethnic segregation constant).14 We
distinguish the case where HA and PA are substitutes (i.e., young people are willing and are
allowed to switch from activities) from the case where HA and PA are not substitutes. If HA
and PA are not substitutes, changes in the utility of HA (PA) can only affect the incentives of
doing HA (PA). If HA and PA are substitutes, changes in the utility of HA (PA) may change
the relative incentives of doing HA and PA, and thus induce young people to switch between
activities.
Let us study the effect of changes in district ethnic segregation. We introduce the perfect
integration scenario where: i) district ethnic segregation is zero: the district and both its wards
have the same share of Greens and thus the same ethnic diversity (Fd = Fw1 = Fw2 = F¯ );
ii) Greens and Purples are equal in number in the district (Ng = Np). i) and ii) imply iii)
Purples in ward 1 and Purples in ward 2 are equal in number (np1 = np2), and Greens in ward
1 and Greens in ward 2 are equal in number (ng1 = ng2). Condition iii) implies (3) and (4)
become, respectively:
14To capture incentives we use marginal utilities. This permits to abstract from the distributions of αHAi
and αPAi.
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EUg2i(HA) =
(Ng − ng1) + τHAnp1
Ng − ng1 + np1 + αHAi (7)
EUp2i(HA) =
np1 + τHA(Ng − ng1)
Ng − ng1 + np1 + αHAi (8)
PROPOSITION 1. a) Starting from the perfect integration scenario, district ethnic segregation
can be increased by moving the Greens from ward 2 to ward 1 (without moving the Purples),
keeping the number of Greens in the district (Ng) constant.
b) If HA and PA are not substitutes, an increase in district ethnic segregation keeping
district ethnic diversity constant increases the incentives of doing HA and leaves the incentives
of doing PA unaffected.
c) if HA and PA are substitutes, an increase in district ethnic segregation keeping district
ethnic diversity constant translates into a further increase in the incentives of doing HA at
the expense of PA.
Proofs of propositions 1.a, 1.b and 1.c are shown in appendix C. Intuitively, an increase
in district ethnic segregation affects the ethnic mix of the wards and thus the utility of doing
HA: the incentives of doing HA increase. An increase in district ethnic segregation does not
change the ethnic mix of the district and thus it does not affect the utility of doing PA: the
incentives of doing PA remain unaffected. If HA and PA are substitutes, the majority of young
people may have incentives to switch from PA to HA (the incentives of doing HA increase
more than the incentives of doing PA). This can make HA increase at the expense of PA.
Therefore, we expect an increase in district ethnic segregation increases HA. The effect on PA
is null or negative, depending on the degree of substitutability between HA and PA.
To study the effects of changes in district ethnic diversity, we introduce the maximum
diversity scenario. In the maximum diversity scenario i) district ethnic diversity is at the
maximum achievable level in our case, i.e., Fd =
1
2
(Greens and Purples are equal in numbers
in the district); ii) district ethnic segregation is at a generic positive level D¯; iii) Purples in
ward 1 and Purples in ward 2 are equal in number (np1 = np2).
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15The new benchmark has been chosen because it is compatible with many levels of segregation. In contrast,
a benchmark with zero district ethnic diversity has, by definition, also zero district ethnic segregation. Like
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PROPOSITION 2. a) Starting from the maximum diversity scenario, district ethnic diversity
can be decreased by increasing the number of Greens in the district (Ng) keeping Purples
(Np) constant, and allocating Greens into wards such that district ethnic segregation remains
constant.
b) If HA and PA are not substitutes, a decrease in district ethnic diversity keeping district
ethnic segregation constant increases the incentives of doing both HA and PA. The incentives
of doing PA increase more than the incentives of doing HA if ∆τ = τPA − τHA ≤ 0. The
incentives of doing HA increase more than the incentives of doing PA if ∆τ = τPA − τHA >
∆¯τ(τHA, τPA) > 0.
c) If HA and PA are substitutes, a decrease in district ethnic diversity keeping district
ethnic segregation constant translates into a further increase of PA at the expense of HA if
∆τ = τPA − τHA ≤ 0; it translates into a further increase of HA at the expense of PA if
∆τ = τPA − τHA > ∆¯τ(τHA, τPA) > 0.
Proofs of propositions 2.a, 2.b and 2.c are shown in appendix C. Intuitively, a decrease
in ethnic diversity increases both the incentives of doing HA and the incentives of doing PA.
If τPA is ‘large enough’ compared to τHA, the incentives of doing HA increases more than
the incentives of doing PA.16 This can happen if, when participating in HA, young people
care about the ethnicity of those they hang around with, when participating in PA, they care
mainly about the purpose of the activity (helping the community, keeping fit). If HA and PA
are substitutes, the majority of the young people may want to switch from the activity whose
incentives increase less to the activity whose incentives increase more.
The threshold ∆¯τ depends on the relative magnitude of τPA and τHA. We present some
simulations for Greens in ward 1, the largest group. We consider a baseline maximum diversity
scenario with 20 Greens and 20 Purples, for different levels of district ethnic segregation (0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5). Figure 3 shows the difference in the marginal expected utility (with respect
to Ng) of HA and PA for Greens in ward 1. In the top panel, ∆τ = 0. The incentives of
doing PA increase more than the incentives of doing HA for any district ethnic segregation
in the previous case, when np1 = np2, the maximum achievable level of segregation is
1
2 .
16In what follows, we refer to this situation as the case where τPA is ‘substantially larger’ than τHA.
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Figure 3: Simulation of ∂EUg1(HA)
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Note: Each panel plots the value of the difference
∂EUg1(HA)
∂Ng
− ∂EUg1(PA)∂Ng when D¯ = 0.1 (solid), D¯ = 0.2
(dashed), D¯ = 0.3 (dotted), D¯ = 0.4 (dot-dash), and D¯ = 0.1 (long dash). Parameters: np1 = 10, τHA =
τPA = 0.5 (top panel), τHA = 0.4 and τPA = 0.6 (middle panel), τHA = 0.2 and τPA = 0.8 (bottom panel).
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and Ng. In the middle panel, ∆¯g1τ > ∆τ > 0 (τPA > τHA, and τPA and τHA are similar in
magnitude). Whether the incentives of doing HA increase more or less than the incentives of
doing PA depends on the level of district ethnic segregation and Ng. In the bottom panel,
∆τ > ∆¯g1τ > 0 (τPA > τHA, and τPA is substantially larger than τHA). The incentives of
doing HA increase more than the incentives of doing PA for any district ethnic segregation
and Ng.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Empirical Model
We model HA and PA as linear functions of district ethnic diversity and segregation as follows:
PAij = α1 + β1Fj + β2Dj + x
′
ijγ1 + ξ1ij (9)
HAij = α2 + β3Fj + β4Dj + x
′
ijγ2 + ξ2ij (10)
Fj and Dj are, respectively, the fractionalisation and the segregation index for the district
j=1,..., m where person i=1,...,n lives. Thus, β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the parameters of inter-
est. Finally, xij is a vector of controls (individual and family characteristics, plus weather
indicators, presented in section 3.2) and ξ1ij and ξ2ij are composite errors, decomposed as:
ξ1ij = ζ1j + η1i + 1ij (11)
ξ2ij = ζ2j + η2i + 2ij (12)
ζ1j and ζ2j are unobserved effects at the district level, η1i and η2i are unobserved effects at the
individual level, while 1ij and 2ij are idiosyncratic components.
Equations (9) and (10) are first estimated via weighted linear probability models (LPM),
17Note that
∂EUg1(HA)
∂Ng
− ∂EUg1(PA)∂Ng > 0 (∀D,Ng) if 12 (τHA + 1) < τPA. Consider figure 3. In the top panel:
τHA = τPA = 0.5 and thus ∆τ = 0. In the middle panel: τHA = 0.4 and τPA = 0.6, thus ∆τ = 0.2. When
τHA = 0.4,
∂EUg1(HA)
∂Ng
− ∂EUg1(PA)∂Ng > 0 (∀D,Ng) if τPA > 0.7, which implies ∆¯g1τ = 0.3, and thus ∆τ < ∆¯g1τ .
In the bottom panel: τHA = 0.2 and τPA = 0.8, thus ∆τ = 0.6. When τHA = 0.2,
∂EUg1(HA)
∂Ng
− ∂EUg1(PA)∂Ng > 0
(∀D,Ng) if τPA > 0.6 which implies ∆¯g1τ = 0.4, and thus ∆τ > ∆¯g1τ .
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with standard errors clustered at the district level.18 In a second approach (IV), ethnic
diversity and segregation are instrumented, and equations (9) and (10) are estimated via
weighted two stages least squares (2SLS), general method of moments (GMM), and limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML), with errors clustered at the district level.19
3.2 Endogeneity of District Ethnic Diversity and Segregation
Identification of causal effects of district characteristics can be problematic. In our case, there
are two types of endogeneity. Endogeneity of type I can arise if people select into districts
on the basis of some unobserved individual characteristics η1i and η2i correlated with Fj and
Dj (e.g., preferences for local public goods, as in Tiebout, 1956). This makes it difficult to
distinguish between the effect of the district as such and the sum of the individual effects
of its inhabitants. Endogeneity of type II can arise when unobserved district characteristics
are correlated with both district ethnic diversity/segregation and social participation, that is
when ζ1j and ζ2j are correlated with Fj and Dj.
Endogeneity of type I can arise when people select into districts for reasons correlated with
both districts’ ethnic diversity/segregation and districts’ opportunities of socialisation. This
requires, for example, that antisocial people dis-proportionally select into ethnically diverse
districts (Putnam, 2007). Endogeneity of type I would also occur if poorer and lower educated
people can only afford districts with worse provision of local public goods (e.g., sport facilities,
parks).20 If those districts are also the most diverse/segregated, the correlation between
district ethnic diversity/segregation and social participation could be spurious.
18Weights are sampling weights. We use LPM, as linear specifications are very tractable and permit a direct
comparison with the IV results. The LPM was also suitable for our case as all the predicted probabilities
estimated for HA through the LPM fell in the [0,1] range, while only one probability for PA fell outside that
range. Note that equations (9) and (10) are estimated individually, although participating in PA and HA
is likely to be a joint decision, and thus 1ij and 2ij are likely to be correlated. Failing to account for this
correlation may lead to a loss of efficiency. We chose not to estimate the equations jointly for comparability
with the IV approach. Joint and non linear estimation of (9) and (10) is presented as a robustness check in
section 5.
19The 2SLS, GMM and LIML estimators have different strengths and weaknesses. The GMM estimator
is more efficient than 2SLS in large samples with heteroskedasticity of the error term caused by clustering.
However, GMM can be undesirable in small samples where precise estimates of higher moments are difficult
(Baum and Schaffer, 2003). LIML are generally preferred in presence of many (potentially week) instruments
and in a small sample, where 2SLS can be seriously biased, while the LIML is median-unbiased.
20Appendix A shows parks and green areas are where young people hang around the most.
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Endogeneity of type II can arise when the central government dis-proportionally invests
in purposeful activities in ethnically diverse or segregated districts to engender community
cohesiveness.21 This problem is unlikely to exist in our case, as recreational activities are
provided by districts. Indeed, for the case of sport, evidence has claimed that investment in
sport undertaken by the central government in the years we consider ‘was not primarily aimed
at getting the local community involved in sport’ (Gratton et al., 2005).
Our empirical strategy limits both types of endogeneity. Endogeneity of type I is limited
as young people are less mobile than adults and are not directly involved in parental location
decisions. Therefore, households’ residential choices are not directly correlated with children’s
taste for social participation and depend mainly on parental characteristics we can control
for. This reduces potential correlations between η1i and η2i and the indices of ethnic diversity
and segregation. Endogeneity of type II is limited as district ethnic diversity and segregation
are measured using 2001 census data (i.e., three years before 2004, when our data on social
participation were collected). This reduces potential correlations between Fj and Dj and the
error term due to districts-specific shocks occurred in 2004.
To address the problem of endogeneity of type I, we include in xij a set of proxies for
preferences and constraints affecting social participation, potentially correlated with Fj and
Dj through endogenous residential choices. At the individual level we control for gender and
ethnicity: two important predictors of preferences for and constraints to social participation
(Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Li, 2006; Platt, 2009). We also control for whether the respondent
was born in 1989 and whether English is not her mother-tongue language. The former captures
differences in age, and anything else affecting people born in different calendar years, the latter
captures ability and willingness to interact with natives.22 At the household level we control for
mother’s characteristics (education, employment status, age), and whether the main parent
21The economic literature generally does not see differences in investment in local public goods by the
local government as an endogeneity problem. It claims ethnic diversity and segregation determine both social
capital and provision of local public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; La Ferrara and Mele, 2007). In our case,
this implies β1, β2, β3 and β4 pick up the total effect of district ethnic diversity and segregation on social
participation, including supply side effects through investment in local public goods. For a discussion of the
supply side effects, see section 7.
22Most LSYPE respondents were born in 1989 or 1990. 19 people were born before or after these dates.
They are excluded from the sample.
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is the mother.23 These variables capture heterogeneity in parental decisions about young
people’s leisure time allocation. We also control for household income (in quintiles) to capture
availability of resources. Finally, we control for the millimetres of rain and the hours of sun
in the month of interview. Our controls may not be enough to avoid any potential source of
endogeneity, especially endogeneity of type II. The IV tackles this.
3.3 Instrumenting Ethnic Diversity and Segregation
3.3.1 The instruments
We propose two new sets of instruments motivated by historical research. The first set uses
measures of proximity to the ports listed in the Aliens Act: a 1905 piece of legislation restrict-
ing the number of ports through which individuals could legally enter into Britain (see Pellew,
1989). The second set of instruments is based on measures of proximity to the so called ‘mill
towns.24 At the end of the second World War, mill town jobs were becoming unattractive for
native people (Simpson, 2004). At the same time, constraints on migration were loosened,
creating an exogenous supply of workers for jobs in the textile industry (Kalra, 2000).These
new workers, who worked night hours and weekends and hardly spoke English, never mixed
with the English majority (Cantle, 2001; Simpson, 2004; Swanton, 2010).
These two historical events had different effects on district ethnic composition. Migrants
located by the ports were likely to be seamen, inclined to temporary migration and used to
traveling and interacting with other ethnicities (Tabili, 1994). Migrants to mill towns were
a fairly homogeneous group, spoke poor English, and had relative long-term perspectives of
staying in England. This led to high diversity and low segregation in ports and high segregation
23Mother’s characteristics are captured through a set of dummy variables. Education variables are: no
education, GCSE and below, above GCSE, degree, missing information on education. Employment status
variables are: mother working full-time, part-time, not working, missing information on employment status.
Age variables are: below 35, 35/50, above 50, missing age. In LSYPE the main parent is the parent most
involved in the young person’s education, who provides household level information. Father’s characteristics
are strongly correlated with mother’s and their measurement is poor due to high non-response. Therefore,
they are not included in the analysis.
24These ports are: Cardiff, Dover, Folkestone, Grangemouth, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull, Leith, Liverpool,
London, Newhaven, Southampton, the Tyne Ports and Plymouth. These mill towns are Manchester, Bolton,
Leigh, Ashton under Lyne, Warrington, Wigan, St Helens, Blackburn, Chorley, Preston, Lancaster, Ramsbot-
tom, Rochdale, Burnley, Accrington, Colne, Bury, Oldham.
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in mill towns. Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 discuss instruments’ exogeneity and relevance.
3.3.2 Exogeneity
Distance from the main ports of entry has been used to instrument cultural diversity in the
USA (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006), following the argument that ports’ location is exogenously
determined by land morphology. Our strategy rests on a similar assumption and has the
further advantage that ports are chosen based on an historical legislative act. This avoids
arbitrary ports selection by the researcher and simultaneous determination of port status (de-
termined in 1905) and social participation (determined in 2004). To be exogenous, Aliens Act
port status should be uncorrelated with district level unobserved effects potentially correlated
with social participation. In other words, cities chosen as ports of entry in 1905 should not
be substantially different from other areas in the provision of social activities, or, if such dif-
ference existed, it should not persist until 2004. This is difficult to test, as, to the authors’
knowledge, there are no data on social activities for the early twentieth century.
To proxy for the provision of social activity we use data on population growth from the
Urban Population database 1801-1911 (Bennett, 2012).25 We want to explore if before the
introduction of the Alien Act future ports of entry were already growing faster (in terms
of population, and thus development) than other areas. The idea is that high development
could be associated with high provision of social activities. Figure B.1 in appendix B plots
the logarithm of population against time. It shows that, although the Aliens Act ports of
entry were on average bigger than other towns or cities, the population growth rate in the
nineteenth century (the slope of the line) for the two groups is almost identical. This suggests
ports listed in the Alien Act were not very different from other areas of Britain in terms of
population growth, and possibly also in terms of unobservables.26
Proximity to mill towns could not be considered an exogenous instrument if the area
25The rationale is that population growth is correlated with economic development (Easterlin, 1967; Ashraf
and Galor, 2011, 2013) and thus potentially to social activities. We are aware this is a coarse proxy determined
by the scarcity of disaggregated historical data.
26Note that differences in population growth between Aliens Act ports and other cities would not invalidate
our identification strategy, however, similarities in population growth could suggest similarity in other aspects,
including development, and thus provision of social activities.
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where the first mill towns were established was more advanced than other areas in terms
of a number of aspects potentially endogenous to social participation, such as technical or
scientific knowledge. This is unlikely for three reasons. First, the spin-off of the industrial
revolution was the presence, in particular areas across Britain, of a strong watch industry
(Allen, 2009) that had only a mediated effect on the British industrial development. The
watch industry increased the availability of cheap, good quality gears (and skilled workers
capable of assembling them), which facilitated the introduction of crucial ‘macro inventions’
(Mokyr, 1990; Allen, 2009).27 Second, the key inventors of the cotton revolution were generally
artisans, rather than leading scientists.28 Third, similar technologies to those incorporated in
the ‘macro inventions’ were already in use in other areas of Britain (Allen, 2009).29
3.3.3 Relevance
Relevant instruments must predict district ethnic diversity (segregation) in 2004. This condi-
tion is satisfied if i) the Aliens Act affected the ethnic composition of the areas by the ports
(the decline of the textile industry and the contemporary loosening of migration constraints
affected the ethnic composition of the areas by the mill towns) ii) the ethnic composition of
Britain resulting from i) persisted until 2004.
We claim condition i) is satisfied for the case of ports of entry, as the Aliens Act was
successfully enforced and thus changed the ethnic composition of the areas by the ports
(Pellew, 1989; Tabili, 1994; Little, 2013). Condition i) is satisfied for the case of mill towns,
as the spread of the cotton industry outside its original location was promptly inhibited by
licensing policies requiring would-be cotton spinning firms to bear the burden of assembling
water frames. This favoured producers located in proximity to the watch industry (Allen,
2009). Condition ii) is satisfied as the migration legislation introduced in the late twentieth
century hindered temporary migration and forced new migrants to move where pioneers had
27The ‘Spinning Jenny’ (1764), the water frame (1769), the carding machine (1775), and the mule (1779).
28Other areas in Britain had stronger links with the scientific community, like London, home of the the Royal
Society, Birmingham, hosting the ‘lunar society’, and Edinburgh, with a world leading school of chemistry.
Allen (2009) shows that, among all the key sectors of the British industrial revolution, the textile industries
was the one with the weakest link with the scientific community.
29Spinning machines have been documented in the early 1700s in Norwich, spinning and carding machine
in Birmingham between late 1730 and late 1750, and carding machines in 1748 in Herefordshire (Allen, 2009).
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already settled down (Holmes, 2001).30 This created a strong correlation between location
decisions of new and old migrants, with the effect that England’s ethnic composition has
remained stable throughout the twentieth century (Pellew, 1989; Holmes, 2001).31
To create our instruments, we compute the inverse of the geodesic distance between each
district in England and the closest Aliens Act port/mill town.32 These measures, together
with the variables in xij, are used to predict district ethnic diversity and segregation. Results
are shown in table B.2 in appendix B. Proximity to ports of entry is positively (negatively)
and significantly correlated with the diversity (segregation) index. Proximity to mill towns is
positively and significantly correlated with the segregation index only.
Table 2: IV1, Instruments Relevance and Exogeneity
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 41.396 0.001
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 377.005 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 2,492.583 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 28.507
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 22.034
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 145.682
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 20.658 0.192
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 13.607 0.628
Note: Tests and are computed using the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al. (2002).
For our IV analysis we allow for a number of non linearities between proximity to ports/mill
towns and district ethnic composition, adding higher orders of the measures of proximity up
to cubic. Further, to capture the effect of ports/mills other than the closest, we compute the
number of ports/mills within a radius of 20, 50, and 100 kilometres, plus the interactions with
30For example, in 1962, the ‘Commonwealth Immigrants Act’ introduced an entry system for Commonwealth
workers based on vouchers. This system was followed in 1968 by a quota system and by further restrictions
based on evidence of partiality in 1971.
31Holmes (2001) documents that the main ethnic groups living in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth
century were the main ethnic groups we observe in table A.10 (African, Caribbean, Indian, Bangladeshi,
Pakistani and Chinese, with the Chinese community being the smallest in size).
32The shortest path between two points a, b of coordinates (lat(a), long(a)) and (lat(b), long(b)) on the
earth surface can be computed using the great circle distance, corresponding to the length of a straight line
in an Euclidean space. The great circle distance is obtained by multiplying the central angle between the
two points (in radians) by the radius of the sphere, i.e. distab = arccos(sin(lat(a)) ∗ sin(lat(b)) + cos(lat(a)) ∗
cos(lat(b)) ∗ cos(| (long(b)− long(a)) |)) ∗ 6371, where 6371 is the radius of the earth in kilometres.
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the measures of proximity (without higher terms). We call this IV approach IV1.33
Tests of instruments’ relevance are presented in table 2 (top two panels). They all sug-
gest the instruments are relevant. The first panel presents underidentification tests, leading
to the conclusion that the model is not underidentified.34 The second panel presents the
Kleibergen-Paap (KP) (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Kleibergen and Schaffer, 2007) and the
Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2016) F-tests on the instruments
in the first stages.35 All F-tests are greater than 10, providing additional evidence in favour of
instruments’ relevance. Instruments’ exogeneity is difficult to test. In case of over-identified
models, most scholars refer to the Sargan-Hansen test to derive an indication of instruments
exogeneity. Sargan-Hansen tests for both PA and HA (see bottom panel of table 2) fail to
reject the null of orthogonality of the instruments.
4 Results
Table 3 shows the coefficients for district ethnic diversity and segregation estimated via LPM.
Four specifications are presented: with district ethnic diversity only (specification 1), with
both district ethnic diversity and segregation (specification 2), with individual controls (spec-
ification 3), with individual, household and weather controls (specification 4). Specification 4
is our main specification.36
The estimated coefficient for district ethnic diversity on HA is negative and strongly sta-
tistically significant in all specifications. The estimated coefficient for district ethnic diversity
on PA is negative in specifications (1) and (2), but goes towards zero when controls are added
33Slightly different IV approaches (IV2, IV3 and IV4) are presented as robustness checks.
34The Kleibergen-Paap (KP) underidentification test tests if the matrix of the reduced form coefficients is
full rank, that is if the correlations between the instruments and the endogenous variables are different from
zero (null hypothesis: the model is underidentified). The Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) underidentification
tests (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2016) test underidentification regressor by regressor.
35The SW F test is considered the most appropriate in the case of multiple endogenous variables. We
also computed the Angrist and Pischke (AP) F-statistics (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). With two endogenous
variables they converge to the SW statistics, and thus results are not reported. In addition, the compari-
son between partial R2 of excluded instruments and Shea’s R2 suggests that both instruments are relevant
(R2(diversity)=0.371, Shea’s R2(diversity)=0.432, R2(segregation)=0.248, Shea’s R2(segregation)=0.289).
36Estimated coefficients for the control variables are shown in table B.3. They generally suggest young
people from richer and more educated households are more likely to choose PA, while young people from more
deprived background, but also young people with working mothers, are more likely to choose HA.
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in specifications (3) and (4). This lack of effect of district ethnic diversity on PA is compatible
with our explanatory model in a case where τPA is substantially larger than τHA. If HA is
motivated by a pure desire of socialisation, while PA is also motivated by other goals (keeping
fit, helping the community), young people may care more (less) about other people’s ethnic-
ity when doing HA (PA). The estimated coefficient for district ethnic segregation on HA is
positive and statistically significant in all specifications. The estimated coefficient for district
ethnic segregation on PA is negative but statistically insignificant in all specifications. These
results are compatible with our explanatory model.
Table 3: Linear Probability Model, Coefficients of Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PA HA PA HA PA HA PA HA
Diversity -0.146 *** -0.316 *** -0.123 *** -0.380 *** -0.066 * -0.204 *** -0.065 * -0.185 ***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.046) (0.036) (0.046)
Segregation -0.079 0.216 *** -0.070 0.242 *** -0.001 0.199 ***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049)
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Individual controls: male, born
in 1989, ethnicity dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is
female, mother’s education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total
rainfall. Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo
station in the interview month. Weighted data.
To have an idea of the magnitude of the effects, consider specification (4). Going from
the median (0.094) to the highest observed ethnic diversity (0.676) leads to a decrease of
around 11 percentage points in the probability of participating in HA. This negative effect
is comparable to the one associated with the dummy variable indicating respondents whose
mother tongue is not English (see table B.3 in appendix B). Similarly, going from the lowest
observed ethnic diversity (0.02) to the median leads to a decrease in HA of just above 1
percentage point. Finally, going from the lowest observed ethnic segregation (0.058) to the
median (0.160) leads to an increase of around 2 percentage points in the probability of HA,
while going from the median segregation to the highest observed value (0.620) increases this
probability by 9 percentage points. This latter effect is larger than the effect of having a
mother with no education, as opposed to having a mother with a university degree (see again
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table B.3).
Table 4: IV1: Second Stages, Coefficients of Interest.
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.065 * -0.042 -0.034 -0.041 -0.185 *** -0.228 *** -0.226 *** -0.228 ***
(0.036) (0.064) (0.060) (0.064) (0.046) (0.077) (0.061) (0.077)
Segregation -0.001 0.182 * 0.132 0.184 * 0.199 *** 0.508 *** 0.516 *** 0.511 ***
(0.048) (0.094) (0.086) (0.095) (0.049) (0.098) (0.032) (0.099)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. IV results are computed using
the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al. (2002). Individual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity
dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s
education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. Each
LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the
interview month. Instruments: proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the
third), number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest
port and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Weighted data.
Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients for ethnic diversity and segregation on PA and HA
when endogeneity is accounted for. They are similar to those obtained via LPM.37 The results
are robust across estimation methods (2SLS, GMM, LIML). The 2SLS and the LIML estimates
are very similar, suggesting our instruments are not weak (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The
estimated IV coefficients for district ethnic diversity and segregation are generally statistically
insignificant for PA and strongly statistically significant for HA. For HA, the coefficients for
district ethnic diversity become more negative than the one estimated via LPM, with increases
in absolute value of up to 23%. The coefficients for district ethnic segregation become more
positive, and more than double in magnitude. For example, 2SLS and LIML suggest that
passing from the median to the highest observed district ethnic diversity (segregation) leads
to a 13 percentage points decrease (23-24 percentage points increase) in HA.
The lack of correlation between PA and district ethnic diversity is coherent with our
explanatory model with τPA is substantially larger than τHA. Moreover, it is also in line
with the critique that part of the negative effects of neighbourhood ethnic diversity on social
participation is due to omitted neighbourhood deprivation (see Letki, 2008). This critique is
valid in our case if: i) ethnically diverse districts are the most deprived ii) district deprivation is
associated with poor access to PA. Indeed, in the specifications without individual, household
37The estimated coefficients for the first stages are shown in tables B.4 and B.5 in appendix B.
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and weather controls (table 3, specifications (1) and (2)) ethnic diversity is found to be
negatively correlated with PA, but such correlation disappears when the endogeneity problem
is addressed first by adding controls and then through the IV approach.
For HA, a similar argument explains why controlling for endogeneity makes the coefficient
of ethnic diversity even more negative. Suppose district ethnic diversity leads to less HA.
Suppose also ethnic diversity is positively correlated with deprivation, and deprivation leads
to more hanging around. Thus, deprivation implies young people in more ethnically diverse
districts do more HA. This positive bias would mask the ‘real’ negative effect of district ethnic
diversity on HA. Thus, the IV coefficient of district ethnic diversity on HA is likely to be more
negative than the LPM one.
There is no literature on the effects of ethnic segregation on the demand of social activities.
On the supply side, La Ferrara and Mele (2007) suggest district ethnic segregation leads to
higher provision of local public goods. If local public goods include parks, security, sport
facilities, clubs, this may facilitate participation in both PA and HA. If less social families
self-select into more segregated districts, this causal effect may only show up when endogeneity
is controlled for. Thus, the IV coefficient of district ethnic segregation on HA and PA is likely
to be more positive than the LPM one.
5 Robustness Checks
We present a number of robustness checks. First, we test the robustness of the results to the
functional form used in the estimation, by estimating the model in (9) and (10) non linearly.
We first estimate the model by probit and then we use a conditional mixed process (CMP),
together with IV1 instruments, to account for endogeneity of district ethnic composition.38
We estimate three different specifications of the CMP. Each specification consists in four
jointly estimated equations. Two equations, equivalent to the first stages in the fully linear
case, estimate district ethnic diversity and segregation. Two equations, estimated by probit,
estimate the probability of taking part in PA and HA. The exogenous variables included in
38Estimation is via limited-information maximum likelihood (stata command cmp, Roodman, 2011)
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the first stages are: CMP1) IV1 instruments and variables xij in (9) and (10); CMP2) IV1
instruments, without variables xij in (9) and (10); CMP3) IV1 instruments on ports of entry
to predict ethnic diversity and IV1 instruments on mill towns to predict ethnic segregation.
Table 5: CMP: Marginal Effects at the Mean
PA HA
Probit CMP1 CMP2 CMP3 Probit CMP1 CMP2 CMP3
Diversity -0.069 * -0.047 -0.065 -0.060 -0.189 *** -0.277 *** -0.231 *** -0.232 ***
(0.037) (0.070) (0.057) (0.060) (0.047) (0.084) (0.071) (0.072)
Segregation -0.004 0.195 * 0.183 * 0.113 0.205 *** 0.524 *** 0.512 *** 0.461 ***
(0.050) (0.114) (0.110) (0.108) (0.052) (0.111) (0.107) (0.110)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Results are computed using
the cmp stata command by Roodman (2011). Individual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity dummies.
Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s education,
age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. Each LSYPE
respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the interview
month. Instruments: proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the third), number
of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest port and the
number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Weighted data.
Marginal effects at the mean (in table 5) are consistent across specifications and similar to
those obtained through linear models. The probit estimation suggests district ethnic diversity
has a small (marginally significant) negative effect on PA, which disappears once endogeneity is
accounted for. The effect of district ethnic segregation on PA is not significant when estimated
via probit and becomes slightly significant and positive in some specifications accounting for
endogeneity of neighbourhood ethnic composition. Results for HA confirm a strong negative
effect of district ethnic diversity and a strong positive effect of district ethnic segregation.
Second, we test the robustness of the results to small changes in the construction of the
instruments. We present three different specifications of the instruments (IV2, IV3 and IV4)
in addition to the IV1 specification used in the body of the paper. The functional form
and the set of controls used remain the same as those used in IV1. IV2 instruments district
ethnic diversity and segregation with measures of proximity to both the first and second
closest port/mill town, their squares, the number of towns within 20, 50 and 100km, and the
interactions between these variables and the proximity from the first and second port/mill
town. IV3 instruments district ethnic diversity and segregation with measures of proximity to
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all the ports and mill towns. IV4 instruments ethnic diversity and segregation with a series of
binary variables capturing the number of ports (mill towns) within a 20, 50, 100 kilometres
radius. Table B.6 shows the tests on the instruments are fully satisfactory for all strategies.
Second stages, shown in table B.7, are in line with those from our main specification. In
conclusion, these robustness checks show the results are robust to modest changes in how
instruments are constructed.
Table 6: RS with IV1 Instruments: LPM and Second Stages (Selected Coefficients).
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.001 0.019 0.009 0.019 -0.287*** -0.460*** -0.406*** -0.462***
(0.081) (0.135) (0.104) (0.136) (0.075) (0.130) (0.106) (0.131)
Segregation 0.029 0.270* 0.178 0.273* 0.193*** 0.447** 0.456*** 0.452**
(0.085) (0.156) (0.142) (0.157) (0.074) (0.181) (0.114) (0.185)
Population -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of 0.025*** -0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.013* -0.012* -0.014** -0.012*
vehicles (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Unemployed -1.855 -0.894 -1.141 -0.883 0.364 1.946 0.613 1.976
(1.997) (2.265) (1.793) (2.271) (1.699) (2.025) (1.586) (2.036)
No 0.167 0.156 0.028 0.155 -0.438 -0.729** -0.374 -0.733**
qualification (0.242) (0.324) (0.288) (0.325) (0.281) (0.335) (0.279) (0.337)
Household -0.013 -0.100 -0.040 -0.101 0.183* 0.164 0.106 0.163
size (0.073) (0.098) (0.089) (0.098) (0.098) (0.122) (0.110) (0.123)
Good -0.103 -0.068 -0.224 -0.067 -0.730 -0.544 -0.069 -0.541
health (0.420) (0.462) (0.418) (0.462) (0.520) (0.557) (0.516) (0.558)
Conception -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** -0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
rate (U18) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
All road 51.490* 50.552* 43.716* 50.549* 32.710 39.386 24.715 39.471
casualties (27.361) (28.127) (26.129) (28.144) (33.749) (34.124) (30.920) (34.158)
IDACI 0.250 0.151 0.225 0.150 0.032 0.093 0.189 0.093
(0.188) (0.211) (0.189) (0.212) (0.198) (0.230) (0.175) (0.231)
N 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. IV results are computed using
the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al. (2002). Individual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity
dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s
education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. District
level controls: population of the district (divided by 10000), number of vehicles in household, percentage
of unemployed people (16-74 years old), percentage of people without any educational qualification (16-74
years old), average household size, percentage of people in good health, under 18 conception rate (multiplied
by 1000), number of road casualties (divided by population of the district), income deprivation affecting
children index (IDACI). Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the
closest meteo station in the interview month. Instruments IV1: proximity to the closest port of entry and
its higher terms (up to the third), number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between
the proximity to the closest port and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Weighted data.
Third, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional district level
characteristics that are likely to affect HA and PA. Such characteristics are: population of
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the district (divided by 10000), average number of vehicles in households, unemployment
rate (for 16-74 years old), percentage of people with no educational qualification (16-74 years
old), average household size, percentage of people in good health, under 18 conception rate
(multiplied by 1000), number of all road casualties (divided by population of the district),
income deprivation affecting children index (IDACI).39
We estimate this richer specification (RS) first via linear probability models and then by
instrumenting district ethnic diversity and segregation with IV1 instruments. In a further
sets of specifications, we also include county fixed effects.40 RS rests on different assumptions
than the main specification of the paper. Controlling for a larger number of district level
characteristics may reduce the district level endogeneity left in the error term. However, while
district ethnic diversity and segregation are allowed to be endogenous (and are instrumented),
the other district level characteristics are assumed exogenous.
Instrument diagnostics for RS models with IV1 are shown in tables B.8 and B.9. The
instruments perform slightly worse than in our main specification. However, the tests are
overall satisfactory. Results from the RS specifications (both LPM and IV) are shown in
tables 6 and 7. They confirm there is no effect of district ethnic composition on PA and there
is a negative (positive) effect of district ethnic diversity (segregation) on HA. These results
are in line with those from our main specification, in spite of the differences in the identifying
assumptions.
Forth, we test the robustness of our results to the use of a completely different IV strategy.
We use the instrumental variable approach introduced by Lewbel (2012) and we apply it both
to the specification without district level controls and to the richer specification with district
level controls, with and without county fixed effects. Lewbel’s approach derives identification
from the standard assumption of exogeneity of the controls and the additional assumption of
39Data on district population, average number of cars, unemployment, health, education, and household
size are from the 2001 Population Census data, while data on road casualties and under 18 conception rate
are from the ‘neighbourhood statistics’ collected by the Office for National Statistics. IDACI is computed at
the Super Output Area and can be obtained with the LSYPE. Data are aggregated by district using sample
weights.
40County is the administrative level higher than the district. We included one dummy for each county in
England and a dummy indicating ‘unitary authorities’: a special type of districts (generally bigger cities)
which do not belong to any county.
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Table 7: RS with IV1 Instruments and County Fixed Effects: LPM and Second Stages (Selected
Coefficients).
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.020 -0.159 -0.179* -0.160 -0.204*** -0.412*** -0.398*** -0.414***
(0.084) (0.135) (0.107) (0.135) (0.071) (0.127) (0.110) (0.127)
Segregation 0.023 0.308* 0.255* 0.311* 0.193*** 0.450*** 0.535*** 0.454***
(0.096) (0.163) (0.146) (0.165) (0.074) (0.161) (0.131) (0.163)
Population -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.013* -0.012* -0.013** -0.012*
vehicles (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Unemployed -1.906 0.059 0.268 0.078 0.290 2.319 1.592 2.345
(2.380) (2.899) (2.018) (2.908) (1.570) (2.133) (1.745) (2.143)
No -0.197 -0.522 -0.644* -0.524 -0.351 -0.770* -0.560* -0.774*
qualification (0.309) (0.408) (0.330) (0.409) (0.322) (0.401) (0.337) (0.402)
Household 0.059 0.046 0.104 0.046 0.099 0.125 0.077 0.125
size (0.088) (0.108) (0.093) (0.109) (0.097) (0.114) (0.095) (0.114)
Good -0.856 -0.777 -0.949* -0.776 -1.031* -0.887 -0.443 -0.886
health (0.557) (0.612) (0.548) (0.613) (0.618) (0.655) (0.568) (0.656)
Conception -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
rate (U18) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
All road 63.470* 68.255** 62.865* 68.278** 1.313 9.908 7.484 9.964
casualties (32.929) (34.190) (32.212) (34.216) (37.005) (38.338) (32.866) (38.371)
IDACI 0.275 0.285 0.311 0.285 0.087 0.163 0.227 0.163
(0.212) (0.260) (0.199) (0.260) (0.188) (0.214) (0.168) (0.215)
N 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. IV results are computed using
the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al. (2002). Individual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity
dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s
education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. District
level controls: population of the district (divided by 10000), number of vehicles in household, percentage
of unemployed people (16-74 years old), percentage of people without any educational qualification (16-74
years old), average household size, percentage of people in good health, under 18 conception rate (multiplied
by 1000), number of road casualties (divided by population of the district), income deprivation affecting
children index (IDACI). Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the
closest meteo station in the interview month. Instruments IV1: proximity to the closest port of entry and
its higher terms (up to the third), number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between
the proximity to the closest port and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Weighted data.
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heteroskedasticity of the error term. It can be used when valid exclusion restrictions are not
available. Results are shown in table 8: they are in line with those obtained with the other
identification strategies.41
Table 8: Heteroskedasticity Constructed Instruments (2SLS): Second Stages (Coefficients of
Interest)
PA HA PA HA PA HA
Diversity 0.042 -0.301 *** 0.108 -0.269 *** -0.029 -0.229 ***
(0.085) (0.094) (0.110) (0.097) (0.107) (0.082)
Segregation -0.054 0.401 *** -0.075 0.275 *** 0.038 0.266 ***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.119) (0.100) (0.120) (0.085)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District level controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
N 14,244 14,244 12,042 12,042 12,042 12,042
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. IV results are computed
using the ivreg2h stata command by Baum and Schaffer (2012). Individual controls: male, born in 1989,
ethnicity dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female,
mother’s education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall.
Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in
the interview month. District level controls: population of the district (divided by 10000), number of
vehicles in household, percentage of unemployed people (16-74 years old), percentage of people without
any educational qualification (16-74 years old), average household size, percentage of people in good health,
under 18 conception rate (multiplied by 1000), number of road casualties (divided by population of the
district), income deprivation affecting children index (IDACI). Weighted data.
The results in this section and in section 4 come from models relying on a very diversified
set of identification assumptions.42 In spite of these differences, they all tell the same story. All
models suggest district ethnic diversity (segregation) has a negative (positive) impact on HA.
These effects become even larger when endogeneity is accounted for, although most robustness
checks suggest the impact of district ethnic segregation on HA is smaller that the one implied
by the IV results in table 4. Where endogeneity is controlled for, we are generally unable to
find negative effects of district ethnic diversity on PA. This is coherent with our explanatory
model where τPA is substantially larger than τHA. We also find some -rather limited- evidence
41Tests of relevance and exogeneity of the instruments as well as tests on the heteroskedasticity of the error
term are shown in tables B.10 and B.11.
42For another paper comparing results from a geographically inspired IV strategy and result from Lewbel’s
IV strategy, see Emran and Hou (2013).
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that there may be a positive effect of district ethnic segregation on PA. In section 7 we provide
evidence suggesting this result is likely to be driven by supply side effects.
6 Demand Side: More on Mechanisms
Our explanatory model focuses on the demand side of social participation. It emphasises the
role of geography: HA takes place in the ward and PA takes place in the district. Moreover,
the model acknowledges HA and PA may be different in nature. In particular, they may differ
in the importance young people attach to the ethnicity of those participating in the activity
(captured by the tolerance parameters τHA and τPA). In this section we argue that differences
in the tolerance parameters τHA and τPA capture a meaningful difference in the nature of PA
and HA, and that geography is important in explaining our results.
In section 4 we claim that the relative magnitude of τHA and τPA may explain why district
ethnic diversity affects participation in HA more than participation in PA. Moreover, we
claim geography explains why district ethnic segregation affects participation in HA more
than participation in PA. Is it possible that the different effect of district ethnic segregation
on HA and PA is not driven by geography and, instead, is driven by the nature of PA and HA,
in a way that is not captured by the tolerance parameters τHA and τPA? In what follows, we
compare two activities similar in nature to claim it is unlikely that our results on the effect of
district ethnic segregation are driven by a difference in the nature of HA and PA not captured
by our model, and that geography is likely to play an important role.
We consider a third activity: ‘hanging around near the city center’ (HC). HC is important
for a number of reasons. First, it is popular among young people: around 30% of our sample
reports having done HC in the four weeks before the interview. Second, HC is similar in nature
to HA, as it is likely to be motivated by the desire to spend time with friends with no specific
goal. Third, due to this similarity, HC is likely to display a high degree of substitutability
with HA. Finally, like PA, HC does not necessarily take place in the ward. We estimate the
effect of district ethnic diversity and segregation on HC. We are particularly interested in the
coefficient for district ethnic segregation. If the results for district ethnic segregation are only
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driven by the nature of the activity, the effects of district ethnic segregation on HC should
resemble the one found for HA. If the geographical scope of the activity also matters, the
effect should get closer to the one found for PA.
Table 9: Hanging Around near the City Center: LPM (Coefficients of Interest)
PA HA HC
Diversity -0.065 * -0.185 *** -0.004
(0.036) (0.046) (0.046)
Segregation -0.001 0.199 *** -0.118 *
(0.048) (0.061) (0.049)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes
N 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Individual controls: male, born
in 1989, ethnicity dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is
female, mother’s education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total
rainfall. Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo
station in the interview month. Weighted data.
Results (in table 9) show district ethnic segregation has a strongly significant positive effect
on HA and a negative effect on HC (significant at the 10% level). As previously discussed,
district ethnic segregation increases the incentives to participate in HA (which takes place in
the ward), but not the incentives to participate in activities, like PA or HC, which may take
place elsewhere in the district. If HA and HC display high substitutability, an increase in
HA can lead to a decrease in HC. In segregated districts, where wards are on average more
homogeneous than the district, people may prefer to hang around near home rather than in
the city center. This suggests the nature of the activity is not the only driver of the results,
and geography plays a role in explaining the impact of district ethnic composition on social
participation.43
43The estimated coefficients of interests obtained instrumenting district ethnic diversity and segregation
using IV1 are shown in table B.12. They confirm a statistically significant negative effect of district ethnic
segregation on HC and a negative -but in most cases not statistically significant- effect of district ethnic
diversity. Tests on instruments relevance, in table B.13, show the instruments are valid. Note that the
substitutability between HA and HC may also explain the coefficient for district ethnic diversity on HC.
According to our explanatory model, social activities (including HC) decrease when district ethnic diversity
increases. HC and HA are similar in nature, and thus it is also likely that τHC ≈ τHA. However, for some
τHC > τHA, an increase in ethnic diversity decreases the incentives of doing HA more than the incentives of
doing HC. For this reason, young people may switch from HA to HC. This may mitigate the negative effect
of district ethnic diversity on HC.
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To further investigate the role of geography, we estimate an augmented model by adding
to our main LPM specification the fractionalisation index at the ward level. The coefficient
for ward ethnic diversity should be negative for HA (HA is discouraged by diverse wards).
Ward ethnic diversity should be irrelevant for PA: its coefficient should be close to zero.44
This augmented model also helps decompose the effect of district ethnic segregation. The
coefficient for ward ethnic diversity captures the effect of district ethnic segregation due to
ward ethnic diversity. Due to the inclusion of ward ethnic diversity, the coefficient for district
ethnic segregation in the augmented model measures the effect of district ethnic segregation
due to the set of available ethnic mix of wards within the district (see La Ferrara and Mele,
2007).
Table 10: Augmented Model with Ward Ethnic Diversity: LPM (Coefficients of Interest)
PA HA PA HA
Full estimation sample
District ethnic diversity -0.065 * -0.185 *** -0.025 0.053
(0.036) (0.046) (0.058) (0.067)
District ethnic segregation -0.001 0.199 *** -0.040 0.176 ***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.117)
Ward ethnic diversity -0.039 -0.212 *
(0.044) (0.117)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Social housing sample
District ethnic diversity 0.076 -0.248 *** 0.135 -0.072
(0.065) (0.057) (0.102) (0.099)
District ethnic segregation -0.018 0.123 * -0.017 0.127 *
(0.099) (0.071) (0.098) (0.070)
Ward ethnic diversity -0.061 -0.181 **
(0.083) (0.089)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,543 3,543 3,543 3,543
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Individual controls: male, born
in 1989, ethnicity dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is
female, mother’s education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total
rainfall. Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo
station in the interview month. Weighted data.
44Reality may partially depart from our simplified framework. For example, when PA are provided in
multiple wards within the districts, young people may choose the activity taking place closer to their house.
Therefore, the coefficient for ward ethnic diversity may become slightly negative also in the case of PA.
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Results are presented in the top panel of table 10 (last two columns). HA is negatively
correlated with ward ethnic diversity, but not with district ethnic diversity. This suggests HA
is likely to take place in the ward, and thus ward ethnic diversity is what primary affects the
choice of engaging in HA. The inclusion of ward ethnic diversity leads to a reduction in the
coefficient for district ethnic segregation if compared to the one in the second column. This is
what we expect, as the coefficient for district ethnic segregation in the second column captures
both the effect of ward ethnic diversity and the effect of the available ethnic mix of wards
within the district. The estimated coefficient for district ethnic segregation in the augmented
model in table 10 remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In sum, results
in table 10 suggest geography plays an important role in explaining participation in HA and
PA.
Ward ethnic diversity may be endogenous to social participation due to endogenous sort-
ing of households into wards. To address this potential problem, we restrict the sample to
respondents living in social housing (see Algan et al., 2016; Bonomi Bezzo, 2017).45 In 2004
social houses were allocated by districts through a waiting list system, and households had
very limited discretionality in the choice of where to live.46 This strongly limits the scope of
endogenous sorting into wards. Results for the ‘social housing’ subsample are presented in the
bottom panel of table 10 (last two columns) and are in line with those for the full estimation
sample. This suggests the results are not driven by endogeneity.47
45We selected respondents who rented either from the council or from a housing association.
46The allocation of social housing was regulated by the Housing Act 1996. Houses were allocated on a
first-come-first-served basis. Priority could be given to subjects who were homeless, lived in unhealthy or
overcrowded accommodations, were ill or disabled. Preferences for location were taken into account only when
a failure to relocate would have caused hardship for the subject or for others. Houses could also be allocated to
avoid the concentration of residents with similar socio-economic characteristics, such that the greatest possible
social mix could be achieved. With the introduction of Choice Based Letting (CBL) schemes, the Homelessness
Act 2002 made it possible for the households to bid for specific properties, although the success of the bid was
not guaranteed. In 2002, only 15% of the districts participated in CBL. This share was just above 20% in 2004
(DCLG, 2010). In our case, CBL schemes could only affect those who applied for social housing between late
2002 and early 2004 in the restricted group of districts participating in the scheme. Therefore, CBL schemes
are unlikely to have substantially affected the randomness of the residential allocation of our ‘social housing’
subsample.
47The results in the first and the second column of the bottom panel of table 10 are derived from estimating
our main specification on the social housing subsample. District ethnic diversity and segregation are likely to
be less endogenous for this subsample than for the full estimation sample. This is because, in 2004, households
who wanted to relocate were pushed to the back of the housing waiting list in the new district. This discouraged
endogenous sorting into districts. Therefore, these results -in line with those obtained in sections 4 and 5- can
be seen as a further robustness check for our main specification.
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7 Supply Side: the Provision of Social Activities
Our explanatory model abstracts from the supply side effects of district ethnic composition, i.e.
how district ethnic composition can affect social participation through the provision of local
public goods. In this section we discuss these supply side effects and we provide evidence that
district ethnic segregation may incentivise PA through increased or better targeted provision
of local sport facilities.
The literature suggests district ethnic diversity discourages the provision of local public
goods, while district ethnic segregation encourages it (Alesina et al., 1999; La Ferrara and
Mele, 2007). If local public goods include parks, sport facilities and clubs, district ethnic
diversity (segregation) may decrease (increase) HA and PA. Our empirical model captures
the total effect of district ethnic composition, i.e., the combination of the effects stemming
from the demand and the supply side. We do not have an identification strategy to separate
the demand and the supply effect. However, it is still interesting to discuss the correlation
between district ethnic diversity and segregation and the provision of local public goods.
We are not aware of the existence of comprehensive data on provision of local public goods
in England. However, we have information on the satisfaction with local sport facilities. As
sport is an important component of PA, this could shed light on how district ethnic diversity
and segregation correlate with the supply of PA. We use the 2005/2006 wave of the Active
People Survey (APS): the closest in time to the LSYPE data used in our main analysis. APS
contains information on around 360,000 respondents, including an indication of the district
respondents live in and a question on satisfaction with local sport facilities.
We measure satisfaction with local sport facilities through an indicator equal to one if the
respondent is fairly/very satisfied with local sport provision.48 We collapse this variable at
the district level and we regress it on the indices of district ethnic diversity and segregation
plus the district level controls used to estimate the RS model in table 6. Table 11 shows
satisfaction with sport facilities is negatively correlated with district ethnic diversity and
positively correlated with district ethnic segregation.
48The other options are ‘neither’ and ‘fairly/very dissatisfied’ with local sport provision.
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We are more confident about making causal statements about the results on district ethnic
segregation in table 11, than about the results on district ethnic diversity in the same table.
Omitted deprivation positively correlated with district ethnic diversity and segregation and
negatively correlated with the provision of sport facilities may lead to overestimate the negative
effect of district ethnic diversity and to underestimate the positive effect of district ethnic
segregation. Therefore, we believe the results in table 11 provide some evidence that district
ethnic segregation may incentivise participation in PA through a increased or better targeted
provision of local public goods.
Table 11: The Role of Supply: Satisfaction with the Provision of Local Sport Facilities (LPM)
Satisfaction
District ethnic diversity -0.109 ***
(0.041)
District ethnic segregation 0.113 ***
( 0.034)
Population -0.000
(0.000 )
Number of vehicles -0.006
(0.004)
Unemployed -1.141
( 0.765)
No qualification 0.185
(0.141)
Household size 0.001
(0.043)
Good health 0.220
(0.248)
Under 18 conception rate -0.001 *
( .000)
All road casualties -20.629
(10.137) **
IDACI 0.136
(0.107)
Constant 0.651 ***
(0.165)
N 241
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Weighted data.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of district ethnic diversity and segregation on social participation.
We focus on social participation for young people, as evidence suggests relational skills are
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formed during adolescence. We distinguish ‘purposeful activities’, which have been found to
be beneficial for young people’s development, from ‘hanging around with friends’, which we
show to be associated with risky behaviours. We study the case of England, where improving
the provision of purposeful activities has become central in the policy agenda (DfES, 2006).
We account for the potential endogeneity of district ethnic diversity and segregation in a
number of different ways, including by proposing a novel set of instruments. All the methods
we use lead to the same conclusions. District ethnic diversity does not discourage participation
in purposeful activities, but it does discourage hanging around with friends. The former is in
line with Letki (2008); the latter is in line with the literature finding negative effects of ethnic
diversity on social interaction (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Costa and Kahn,
2003; Pennant, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Charles and Kline, 2006; Putnam,
2007). District ethnic segregation increases hanging around with friends. Positive effects of
district ethnic segregation on participation in purposeful activities are weak and are likely to
be driven by supply side effects. To the authors’ knowledge, these findings on the effect of
district ethnic segregation on social participation are new.
Our findings have important policy implications. At least for the case of England, we
show that ethnic diversity does not seem detrimental for young people’s social participation.
In fact, greater ethnic diversity could limit hanging around with friends and the potential
risks associated with it. In contrast, ethnic segregation may be detrimental, as it is found
to encourage hanging around. Thus, desegregation policies, in combination with policies
improving the supply of purposeful activities, are more likely to have beneficial effects on
young people’s well-being than policies limiting migration to preserve ethnic homogeneity.
Our analysis focuses on the impact of ethnic diversity and segregation on social participa-
tion. Other forms of diversity and segregation, for example regarding income, social status,
education, are likely to play a role in determining social participation. Our explanatory model
can be adapted to analyse other forms of diversity and segregation. This is a fascinating ex-
ercise, which is left for future research.
Utrecht University
University of Essex
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A Appendix: Social participation for young people
A.1 Introduction
This appendix describes young people’s social participation. The first part describes the
phenomenon of hanging around with friends in England. It answers four questions: i) Is
hanging around near home pervasive among teenagers? ii) When do teenagers hang around?
iii) Is hanging around a problem? iv) What are the consequences of teenagers hanging around
on adults’ well-being? This analysis gives an idea of why hanging around has received so much
attention in the policy debate and why a study of the phenomenon is needed. The second part
investigates the short and long term consequences of hanging around and purposeful activities
on teenagers’ human capital accumulation, involvement in risky behaviours and social ties.
We conclude social participation in teenage years has potentially long lasting effects on crucial
domains of people’s life. The third part presents evidence that young people prefer to interact
with others from the same ethnic group. This is a crucial assumption in our explanatory
model and thus it is important to show that it has some empirical support in our case.
A.2 Hanging Around with Friends: a Description
This section describes what it means for teenagers to hang around with friends. We use the
the British Crime Survey (BCS), which collects data on major crimes, as well as (perceived)
antisocial behaviours, such as teenagers hanging around, noise and loud parties, vandalism
and graffiti, drug dealing and using, drunkenness and alcohol related violence. We use data
from the 2004-2005 BCS adult main sample (over 45,000 respondents) and data on young
people aged 14-15 from the 2009 under 16 sample (over 3,600 respondents). We restrict the
analysis to young people aged 14/15: the age group we study in the body of the paper.49
Hanging around near home is a pervasive phenomenon among young people. Figure A.1.a
shows that almost 60% of the 14/15 years old 2009 BCS respondents hang around at least
49The BCS has been collected biannually from 1982 and 2001 and annually afterward. For adults, we use
2004-2005 data as this is the time span covered by our main analysis. Data on under 16 are not available for
2004. Therefore, we use data from 2009, the closest available year. Data are weighted to account for sample
design and non-response.
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once a week, and more than one in four respondents (27.41%) hangs around more than three
times a week. In contrast, only one in ten respondents (10.52%) never hangs around. Young
people tend to hang around locally. When asked to report where they hang around (see figure
A.1.b), respondents mention local shops in almost 6% of the cases and streets outside home in
almost 13%. Some of the green areas, mentioned in around 38% of the cases, are also likely to
be local. In sum, figure A.1 suggests hanging around near home is a common activity among
British 14/15 years olds.
Figure A.1: Is Hanging Around with Friends near Home Pervasive?
27.41%
31.75%
18.33%
11.99%
10.52%
three or more times per week once or twice a week
once or twice a month less than once a month
never
a. How often do you hang around?
5.53%
6.94%
8.64%
12.66%
28.21%
38.02%
outside local shops Other places
streets not near home streets outside/near home
shopping centres/town centre park/green/scrubland/playground
b. Where do you hang around?
Note: British Crime Survey, under 16 sample, 2009. Weighted data. Graph a: N. 478. Graph b: The question
has not be asked to those who never hang around. N=422. The category Other places includes: river/lake:
0.13%; community/youth center: 0.19%; subway and underpasses: 0.25%; outside school: 0.32%; at/outside
cinemas: 0.32%; beach: 0.44%; outside pubs, clubs, bars: 0.51%; leisure centre/swimming pool/other sports:
0.95%; railway, underground, bus stations: 1.10%; home or friend’s home: 1.08%; car parks 1.14%; somewhere
else 0.82%.
Data on when teenagers hang around -from the 2004 BCS main sample of adult respondents-
help shed light on the type of activities displaced by hanging around. Hanging around does
not only take place in the weekend, when teenagers have more free time. An overwhelming
majority of BCS adult respondents (84.24%) report seeing teenagers hanging around during
both weekends and weekdays (see figure A.2.a). Hanging around is mainly concentrated in the
evening from 6-11pm (see figure A.2.b). Hanging around in the morning is recorded in 1.12%
of the cases. This share reaches 8.32% if ‘hanging around all the time’ is added. Hanging
around in the afternoon before 6 and in the night after 11 pm accounts for around 8% and
50
14.08% of the cases, respectively. In sum, the data suggest hanging around does not generally
happen during school time (mornings and early afternoon), although the share of teenagers
observed to hang around during school time is not negligible. Hanging around also takes place
at night. This is potentially harmful for teenagers, as it interferes with their sleep.
Figure A.2: When Teenagers Hang Around
4.17%
11.59%
84.24%
weekdays
weekends
both
a. When teenagers hang around
7.20%
11.71%
14.08%
1.12%
65.88%
mornings all the time
afternoons night (after 11pm)
evening (6 - 11pm)
b. What time teenagers hang around
Note: British Crime Survey, main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. Graph a: N=3,526. Graph b:
N=3,529.
Figure A.3 shows teenagers hanging around is perceived as a pervasive problem. Figure
A.3.a shows around 20% of the young people consider teenagers hanging around a ‘very
big’ or a ‘fairly big’ problem. Among adults, this figure reaches 29.56% (see figure A.3.b).
Problems of comparable magnitude to teenagers hanging around, as reported by adults, are:
rubbish lying around (very or fairly big problem for 29.29% of the respondents), vandalism
and graffiti (very or fairly big problem for 27.26% of the respondents), people using or dealing
drugs (very or fairly big problem for 24.98% of the respondents). Less than 22% of the adults
consider drunk people a very or fairly big problem. Abandoned and burnt out car and racially
motivated attacks are very or fairly big problems for only 11.25% and 6.23% of the adults,
respectively.50 Similar conclusions can be derived from figure A.4. Adults consider teenagers’
hanging around the main problem of their neighbourhood both when they report the three
main problems (figure A.4.a) and when they select the main one (figure A.4.b).
50To ensure comparability, the figures on the perception of different antisocial behaviour are derived on the
same subset of respondents with valid data for all antisocial behaviours. Note that data in figures A.3 and
A.4 are likely to measure a combination of how worrisome and how prevalent a behaviour is perceived.
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Figure A.3: Problems in the Neighbourhood
5.79%
13.45%
29.08%
51.68%
a. 14/15 years old young people
9.07%
20.47%
38.17%
32.28%
b. Adult respondents
very big problem fairly big problem not a very big problem not a problem at all
Note: British Crime Survey. Weighted data. Graph a. Under 16 sample, 2009. Weighted data. N=475.
Graph b: main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. N=42,442.
Figure A.4: Problems in the Neighbourhood
7.80%
9.05%
9.17%
9.28%
9.34%
9.94%
12.67%
13.20%
19.56%
people being drunk fireworks
people using or dealing drugs uncontrolled dogs or dog mess
vandalism, graffiti other
rubbish or litter lying around cannot choose one
teenagers hanging around
a.Three main problems in the neighbourhood
5.14%
7.40%
8.34%
9.28%
11.56%
12.85%
14.60%
30.83%
fireworks people being drunk
uncontrolled dogs or dog mess vandalism, graffiti
other rubbish or litter lying around
people using or dealing drugs teenagers hanging around
b. Main problem in the neighbourhood
Note: British Crime Survey, main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. Graph a: N=21,702. Graph b:
N=11,914. Graph a: other is constructed as follows: people being attacked due to ethnicity 0.78%; people
begging: 1.06%; people being insulted: 2.13%; abandoned or burnt out cars: 2.75%; noisy neighbours or loud
parties 4.00%. Graph b: other is constructed as follows: people being attacked due to ethnicity 0.80%; people
begging: 0.84%; people being insulted: 1.42%; abandoned or burnt out cars: 1.84%; noisy neighbours or loud
parties 4.63%; cannot choose one 2.03%.
Figure A.5 sheds light on why teenagers hanging around is perceived so negatively. Almost
65% of the adults consider teenagers hanging around on the streets deliberately antisocial.
The antisocial behaviours most frequently reported are generally minor and include: swearing
(15.3%), being general nuisance (14.36%), being loud and noisy (13.93%). Drinking is the most
frequently mentioned risky behaviour (11.22%). Other risky or illegal behaviours like mugging,
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Figure A.5: Why Teenagers are a Problem
35.18%
64.82%
no yes
a. Teenagers are deliberately antisocial
6.00%
7.42%
8.92%
9.63%
11.22%
13.49%
13.93%
14.36%
15.03%
blocking the entrance to shops being abusive/insulting people
blocking the pavement littering
drinking other
being loud, rowdy or noisy just being a general nuisance
swearing/using bad language
b. Why teenagers are a problem
British Crime Survey, main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. Graph a: N=3,729; Graph b: N=3,603.
Other is constructed as follows: other: 0.15%; mugging or robbing people: 0.59%; physically assaulting people:
0.85%; not doing anything in particular: 0.90%; damaging property or cars: 3.73%; fighting with each other
3.94%; doing graffiti: 4.05%; taking drugs: 4.05%; intimidating or threatening people: 4.85%.
robbing, intimidating, threatening or physically assaulting people, damaging property or cars,
fighting, doing graffiti, or taking drugs are infrequent individually, but all together account
for 13% of the cases (see figure A.5b). These data suggest hanging around, while not criminal
per se, is associated with illegal and antisocial behaviours.51
Teenagers hanging around affect adults’ well-being. Adults evaluated the effect on teenagers
hanging around on the quality of their life using a 10 points scale, where 10 means ‘very af-
fected’. In 2004, the mean was 3.64 (for comparison, the means for vandalism and for people
using or dealing drugs were respectively 3.34 and 3.10). The most common emotional response
triggered by teenagers hanging around was annoyance (almost 30% of the cases, as shown in
figure A.6). Many respondents also reported anger (14.10%), frustration (13.29%), worry
(12.70%). More extreme expressions of distress are less frequent (crying: 0.49%; depression:
1.08%; anxiety/panic attacks: 1.37%; shock: 1.51%; stress: 4.58%), but all together account
for more than 9% of the cases. Around 70% of the respondents reported direct consequences
51The under 16 module does not contain self-reported data on illegal behaviours taking place while young
people hang around. However, it contains data on the reasons why adults (mainly the police or members of
the public) have asked young people to move from the place where they were hanging around. These data
are in line with those from the adult module, and show the young people are generally asked to move due to
minor antisocial behaviours (e.g., being noisy), but also that behaviours like smoking, drinking, intimidating
others and damaging properties or areas are associated with hanging around.
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Figure A.6: Reaction to HA and Action Taken
5.32%
6.39%
7.19%
11.14%
12.70%
13.29%
14.10%
29.86%
loss of confidence/feeling vulnerable fear
other none of these
worry frustration
anger annoyance
a. Reactions
5.68%
6.66%
7.12%
7.65%
8.29%
8.32%
12.90%
13.34%
30.05%
use a car/taxis rather than walk in the local area thought about moving away
encouraged family or friends not to go out alone improved home/car security
felt unsafe avoid going out on my own
avoid going out after dark avoid certain places in my local area
none of these
b. Direct effects
Note: British Crime Survey, main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. Graph a: N=3,792. Other is
constructed as follows: other: 0.47%; crying/tears: 0.49%; depression: 1.08%; anxiety/panic attacks: 1.37%;
shock: 1.51%; stress: 4.58%. Graph b: N=3,792. Other is constructed as follows: avoid staying home: 0.40%;
being assaulted: 0.48%; moved out of an area: 0.50%; carry a personal security device: 0.89%; not been able
to sleep at times: 2.97%; not very trusting of people in the local area 4.85%; other: 0.47%.
of the emotional distress caused by the teenagers hanging around. These include: avoiding
certain places in the local area (13.34%), avoiding going out after dark (12.90%) or alone
(8.32%), improving home or car security (7.65%), encouraging family or friends not to go out
alone (7.12%), thinking about moving away (6.66%), using the car instead of walking (5.68%).
Only 34% of the respondents made a complain, but about one third of them (11,13% of the
total) complained directly to the police (see figure A.7.a). Interestingly, 16.7% of those who
did not complain, failed to do it for fear of reprisal by offenders. This suggests the relative
low incidence of complaints is unlikely to be due to a low perceived salience of the problem.
A.3 The Impact of Hanging Around with Friends and Purposeful Activities on Young People’s
Well-being
To assess the effect of hanging around on teenagers’ contemporaneous and future well-being,
we use LSYPE data (and its longitudinal dimension), together with propensity score tech-
niques. Hanging around with friends is measured at wave one. As outcome variables, we use
contemporaneous (at wave one) and future (at waves five, six and seven) indicators of human
capital investment and risky behaviours, and future indicators (at wave seven) of strength of
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Figure A.7: HA Reported to Somebody
7.45%
11.13%
15.50%
65.91%
young people
police
other
not complained to anyone
a. Complained to
7.86%
8.36%
8.47%
10.16%
11.77%
12.92%
14.26%
26.22%
doesn't affect me personally inconvenient/too much trouble
did not know who to contact authorities could have done nothing
authorities would not interested other
fear of reprisal by offenders too trivial/not worth reporting
b. Why not complained
Note: British Crime Survey, main adults sample, 2004/2005. Weighted data. Graph a: N=3,530. Other is
constructed as follows: pub landlord/bar manager: 0.60%; landlord of the house or flat 0.72%; neighbourhood
warden 0.92%; teachers or local school: 1.64%; tenants/residents association 1.70%; local councillor/mp:
2.20%; neighbourhood watch: 2.29%; local council department 3.85%; parents/family/friends of young people
4.17%; other: 1:47%. Graph b: The question is only asked to those who didnt complain with anyone. N=2,301.
Other is constructed as follows: dislike/fear of police/authorities: 0.31%; previous bad experience of the police
0.80%; just accept it 0.84%; private/personal/family matter 1.84%; waste of time 1.99%; problem is already
known 2.37%; dealt with matter myself/ourselves 72%; other 2.14%.
social ties (see table A.1).52 The analysis investigates whether HA is as negative as described
in the BCS data presented above. We investigate whether HA displaces investment in human
capital (reading or study time) and encourages risky behaviours, and whether these effects
persist over time. We also investigate whether HA engenders the creation of long-lasting
friendship ties. This potentially positive effect of HA is overlooked in the political debate.
Table A.2 compares the means of the outcome variables for respondents who hang around
52The wording of the questions used to derive the variables in table A.1 is the following: 1. ‘During an
average week in term time, on how many evenings do you do any homework?’ (respondents are prompted
to consider only weekdays from Monday to Friday inclusive); 2. ‘How often do you read books, magazines
or newspapers for pleasure?’ (available answers: most days, more than once a week, once a week, less than
once a week, never); 3. ‘Have you applied for a place on a university course which will start either this year
that is in September/October 2008 or next year, that is in September/October 2009?’; 4. ‘Have you received
any offers of places yet, either conditional offers or unconditional offers?’; 7. ‘Do you ever smoke cigarettes
at all?’; 8. ‘Have you ever had a proper alcoholic drink? That is a whole drink, not just a sip. Please do
not count drinks labelled low alcohol’; 9. ‘Have you ever tried cannabis even if only once?’; 10. ‘Have you
ever written on walls with spray cans?’; 11. ‘Have you ever smashed, slashed or damaged public property or
something in a public place?’; 12. ‘Have you ever taken something from a shop, supermarket, or department
store without paying?’ 13. ‘Have you ever taken part in fighting or some sort of disturbance in public for
example, at a football ground, a railway station, music festival, riot, demonstration or just in the street?’;
14. ‘Have you ever had sex without using precautions or contraception?’ (respondents are prompted not to
include any times when trying for a baby); 15. ‘Have you ever taken cannabis?’; 16. ‘Have you ever taken
other drugs?’; 17 ‘How many close friends do you have, that is friends you could talk to if you were in some
sort of trouble?’ (available answers are: none, 1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-9, 10 or more). Variables in rows 5 and 6 are
derived from a number of different questions.
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Table A.1: Outcomes Description
Measure Variable creation Wave Age
Human capital
1. Homework
Number of days spent doing homework (for respondents who are
given homework)
1 14/15
2. Reading
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent reads for pleasure at
least once a week, and zero otherwise
1 14/15
3. Applied for Higher
Education
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has applied for a
place in HE, and zero otherwise
5 18/19
4. Offers from Higher
Education
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has received an offer
from Higher Education institutions, and zero otherwise
5 18/19
5. In Higher Education
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent attends HE, and zero
otherwise
7 20/21
6. Russell group
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent attends a HE
institution in the Russel group, and zero otherwise
7 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarette
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever smoked
cigarettes, and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
8. Tried alcohol
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever had a proper
alcoholic drink, and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
9. Tried cannabis
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever tried
cannabis, and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
10. Done gaffiti
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever written on
walls with spray cans, and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
11. Vandalised
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever vandalised
public property, and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
12. Shoplifted
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever shoplifted,
and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
13. Involved in fights
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever shoplifted,
and zero otherwise.
1 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever had unsafe
sex, and zero otherwise.
6 19/20
15. Tried cannabis
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever taken
cannabis, and zero otherwise.
6 19/20
16. Tried other drugs
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever taken drugs
other than cannabis, and zero otherwise.
6 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close
friends
Numerical variable obtained by taking the mid-points of the bands
used to record number of friends.
6 19/20
at wave one (HA respondents) and respondents who do not hang around at wave one (non-
HA respondents). All differences are statistically significant. HA respondents experience
lower human capital accumulation than non-HA respondents. For example, at age 14/15, HA
respondents spend 14% less time (almost half evening) doing homework. By age 18/19, HA
respondents are over 25% (12 percentage points) less likely to apply to, and receive offers from
Higher Education institutions. Two years later, they are 27% (11 p.p.) less likely to be in
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Higher Education and 31% (three p.p.) less likely to be in a Russell group university.53 HA
respondents are also more likely than non-HA respondents to be involved in risky behaviours.
At the age of 14/15, HA respondents are 69% (23 p.p.) more likely to have tried alcohol and
81% (7 p.p.) more likely to have shoplifted. They are more than twice as likely to have tried
cigarettes or cannabis, and to have been involved in graffiti, vandalising, and fights. These
differences in risky behaviours reduce only slightly with time. By age 19/20, HA respondents
are 61% (24 p.p.) more likely to have had unsafe sex, 67% (15 p.p.) more likely to have tried
cannabis, and 86% (6 p.p.) more likely to have tried other drugs. Finally, table A.2 shows
HA have 6% more close friends in adulthood.
Table A.2: Tests for Equality of Means for HA
Mean t-tests N. Observations
HA Non-HA Difference S.e. p-value HA Non-HA Age
Human capital
1. Homework 2.546 2.950 -0.404 0.027 0.000 6794 6101 14/15
2. Reading 0.725 0.783 -0.058 0.008 0.000 6943 6239 14/15
3. Applying to Higher Education 0.346 0.466 -0.119 0.010 0.000 4627 4249 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 0.327 0.434 -0.108 0.010 0.000 4623 4246 18/19
5. In higher Education 0.299 0.409 -0.110 0.010 0.000 4291 4001 20/21
6. In Russell group 0.064 0.092 -0.029 0.006 0.000 4282 3996 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 0.132 0.058 0.074 0.005 0.000 6575 5987 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.579 0.343 0.236 0.009 0.000 6552 5935 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 0.117 0.052 0.065 0.005 0.000 6758 6068 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.088 0.039 0.049 0.004 0.000 6823 6098 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.136 0.060 0.076 0.005 0.000 6698 6044 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.147 0.081 0.066 0.006 0.000 6720 6041 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.247 0.122 0.125 0.007 0.000 6698 6018 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.628 0.390 0.238 0.016 0.000 4289 3996 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.381 0.228 0.152 0.010 0.000 4239 3966 19/20
16. Tried other Drugs 0.134 0.072 0.062 0.007 0.000 4246 3968 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close Friends 5.660 5.339 0.321 0.075 0.000 4237 3947 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7.
The differences in means in table A.2 cannot be interpreted as causal. They are likely to
be due to a combination of selection and causal effect. Young people who are less interested
in studying and reading and more attracted by risky behaviours are likely to self select into
HA. This is the selection effect. The potential causal effect is threefold. First, the time spent
hanging around is subtracted to studying and reading. Thus, HA may harm human capital
53The Russell Group is a self selected group of 24 public funded universities. Affiliation to the Russell group
is often perceived as a signal of high quality education.
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accumulation through a decrease in study/reading time. Second, hanging around takes place
without the supervision of adults. This reduces the likelihood of being sanctioned and thus
the cost of risky behaviours. Third, if ‘risky’ young people self-select into HA, peer-effects may
encourage less study and more risky behaviours. The fact that HA respondents form stronger
friendship ties, while positive per se, might exacerbate the role of negative peer-effects.
To shed light on the causal effect of hanging around (here ATET, or Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated) on young people’s human capital accumulation, risky behaviours and
social ties, we use propensity score techniques. We use the distance-weighted radius matching
with bias adjustment by Lechner et al. (2011), which weights the control observations using
the inverse of their distance from the corresponding treated observation.54 Distance-weighted
radius matching limits the likelihood of a bad match, and thus is more precise and less biased
than nearest neighbour matching. This is particularly desirable in our case, where the treat-
ment group is larger than the control group. Moreover, the estimator has been proven to be
robust to misspecification of the propensity score (Huber et al., 2013, 2015).
With propensity scores, identification of ATET relies on having observable covariates that
permit to predict the treatment such that, conditional on the propensity score, the potential
outcomes in the absence of treatment are independent of the treatment assignment (Condi-
tional Independence Assumption, CIA). To try and satisfy this assumption, we estimate the
propensity score using a large set of individual, household and neighbourhood characteristics
from wave one, including a set of characteristics measured at birth and in early age.55 In
addition, identification of ATET relies on each treated observation having a non treated coun-
54The weights are then used in a regression to correct the bias due to the mismatch. The estimator is
implemented in stata through the command ‘radiusmatch’ (Huber et al., 2012).
55These variables are: respondent’s characteristics, i.e., gender, ethnicity, birth weight, whether the re-
spondent was born early, whether the respondent has attended a nursery in her early childhood, month of
birth (in months of distance from the previous August, when school starts); household characteristics, i.e.,
household income (in quintiles), whether the household has a computer at home, whether the household has
internet access, whether the household has family dinners every or most days, whether the main parent is
female, mother’s and father’s education (degree, above GCSE, GCSE and below, no education), mother’s and
father’s employment status (full time, part time, not working), religion of main parent, health of main and
second parent, number of cars (none, one, two, more than two), whether mother/father was NEET when the
respondent was five, total months of unemployment of mother/father since the respondent was born, whether
the respondent has ever lived in a single parent household; neighbourhood characteristics, i.e., indices of ethnic
fractionalisation and segregation, as used in the paper. We also add survey weight as in Rubin (2001). Dummy
variables are used with categorical variables, with a separate dummy indicating missing data.
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terpart with similar characteristics and thus propensity score (common support assumption).
Figure A.8: Propensity Scores for Treated and Controls Before and After Matching (HA)
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Note: The ‘Before’ graphs show the distribution of the propensity scores for the treated (black dashed line)
and the control observations (grey solid line) before the matching. The ‘After’ graphs show the distribution of
the propensity scores for the treated (black dashed line) and the control observations (grey solid line) where
the control observations within a certain radius from the treated have been weighted proportionally to the
inverse of their distance from the treated. Weights for the treated observations are equal to 1.
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Figure A.9: Standardised Bias for Covariates Before and After Matching (HA)
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Note: The grey dots indicate the bias in the covariates before the matching, the black ‘x’ signs indicate the
bias in the covariates after the matching. The bias after the matching is computed after weighting the control
observations using the inverse of their distance from the corresponding treated observation.
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For each outcome analysed, figure A.8 shows the distribution of the propensity score for
the treated and the control observations before and after the matching. The post-matching
distributions are derived by re-weighting the pre-matching propensity scores using weights
obtained in the matching procedure. The post-matching distributions for the treated and the
control observations overlap for all outcomes.56 This shows the common support assumption
holds. While the pre-matching distributions of the propensity score for the treated and the
control observations are clearly different, the post-matching distributions are almost identical.
This provides a first glance into the ability of the propensity scores of making treated (HA
respondents) and control (non-HA respondents) observations comparable.
Figure A.9 shows the standardised percentage bias (i.e., covariate imbalance) for each
covariate before and after the matching. While the pre-matching bias is substantial (between
-40 and +40 standardised percentage bias), the post-matching bias is close to zero for all
covariates. Diagnostics on overall post-matching covariates imbalance are reported in table
A.3 and A.4.57 All tests suggest our propensity scores are satisfactory. The R statistics are
close to one, the B statistics are generally below 16 (see table A.3). The mean and the median
bias, that before the propensity score exceeded five and seven percent, respectively, now drop
at or below 1 percent (see table A.4). The pseudo R2 are very close to zero (and much smaller
than those before the matching), and the likelihood test is not able to reject the hypothesis
of joint insignificance of the observables in explaining the propensity score (see table A.4).
Table A.5 shows the ATETs estimated via propensity score matching. The effect of HA
suggested by the ATETs are all statistically significant (generally at the one percent level),
and maintain the same sign as the t-tests in table A.2. However, the ATETs are smaller in
magnitude. They suggest HA respondents spend 7% less time doing homework (one fifth of
a day) than non-HA respondents and are 4% (three p.p.) less likely to read for pleasure at
56Weights for the treated observations are equal to 1. The number of off-support observations ranges from
a minimum of zero to a maximum of 14. These observations have not be used in the analysis.
57R is the ratio between the variance of the propensity score index for HA and non-HA respondents; B is the
standardised difference in the means of the propensity scores computed for the HA and the matched non-HA
respondents. To be satisfactory, R should be close to one, and surely between 0.5 and 2, while B must be below
25 (Rubin, 2001). The Pseudo R2 is derived from regressing the propensity score on the covariates used to
estimate the propensity score. Reported p-values are from the likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance
of those covariates.
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least once a week. HA respondents are 10 and 12% (six and five p.p.) less likely to apply to
and receive offers from Higher Education institutions, respectively. They are also 13% (five
p.p.) less likely to be in Higher Education at age 20/21. The ATET for attending a Russell
group university is -12% (one p.p.), but it is at the verge of statistical significance.
Table A.3: Propensity Score: Diagnostics, part one (HA)
R B
Before After Before After Age
Human capital
1. Homework 0.671 1.018 56.441 13.569 14/15
2. Reading 0.671 1.150 56.129 12.111 14/15
3. Applied to Higher Education 0.712 1.150 55.183 14.138 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 0.710 1.043 55.196 16.073 18/19
5. In Higher Education 0.747 1.228 54.649 15.896 20/21
6. In Russell group 0.748 1.183 54.655 13.925 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 0.677 1.207 56.970 13.123 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.678 1.176 57.145 11.848 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 0.675 1.015 56.516 12.693 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.670 1.117 56.332 11.331 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.669 1.118 56.616 11.653 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.669 0.930 56.334 13.151 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.665 1.106 56.661 10.809 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.760 1.395 55.407 15.564 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.758 1.565 55.405 14.559 19/20
16. Tried other drugs 0.749 0.836 55.156 14.986 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 0.749 0.998 55.076 15.626 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
The estimated ATETs for risky behaviours at wave one are between five (done graffiti)
and 13 p.p. (tried alcohol). These effects translate into 112% and 39%, respectively. The
ATETs for having had unsafe sex (17 p.p.) and having tried cannabis by age 19/20 (12 p.p.)
are sizeable. In percentage, these ATETs suggest HA increases the probability of both risky
behaviours by around a half. Equally, the ATET for trying other drugs, only four p.p., signals
an increase of more than half, when seen in percentage. Finally, the ATET for the number of
close friends at age 19/20 is small in magnitude (around 5%), and very close to the estimate
obtained using simple t-tests and reported in table A.2.
In summary, our results suggest the differences observed in the mean outcomes of HA and
non-HA respondents are partially due to selection. However, there might be a causal effect
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Table A.4: Propensity Score: Diagnostics, part two (HA)
Median bias Mean bias Chi prob R2
Before After Before After Before After Before After Age
Human capital
1. Homework 5.664 0.658 8.200 0.993 0.000 0.937 0.055 0.003 14/15
2. Reading 5.544 0.791 8.177 1.007 0.000 0.996 0.055 0.003 14/15
3. Applied to Higher Education 5.108 0.970 7.986 1.221 0.000 0.999 0.053 0.004 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 5.165 1.206 7.985 1.456 0.000 0.964 0.053 0.005 18/19
5. In Higher Education 5.313 1.256 7.688 1.435 0.000 0.990 0.052 0.005 20/21
6. In Russell group 5.420 0.938 7.705 1.340 0.000 1.000 0.052 0.004 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 5.726 0.860 8.323 1.067 0.000 0.982 0.056 0.003 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 5.328 0.974 8.302 1.122 0.000 0.999 0.057 0.003 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 5.529 0.828 8.202 0.997 0.000 0.990 0.055 0.003 14/15
10. Done graffiti 5.378 0.812 8.191 0.899 0.000 1.000 0.055 0.002 14/15
11. Vandalised 5.371 0.776 8.270 0.859 0.000 1.000 0.056 0.002 14/15
12. Shoplifted 5.519 0.912 8.259 1.186 0.000 0.974 0.055 0.003 14/15
13. Involved in fights 5.607 0.720 8.306 0.905 0.000 1.000 0.056 0.002 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 5.231 0.930 7.789 1.310 0.000 0.991 0.053 0.005 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 5.539 1.111 7.835 1.343 0.000 0.999 0.053 0.004 19/20
16. Tried other drugs 5.546 1.080 7.816 1.169 0.000 0.999 0.053 0.004 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 5.466 1.010 7.776 1.558 0.000 0.993 0.053 0.005 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
Table A.5: Propensity Score: Estimated ATET (HA)
ATET
Estimate s.e. p-value Age
Human capital
1. Homework -0.202 0.035 0.000 14/15
2. Reading -0.030 0.010 0.002 14/15
3. Applied to Higher Education -0.056 0.013 0.000 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education -0.045 0.013 0.000 18/19
5. In Higher Education -0.052 0.013 0.000 20/21
6. In Russell group -0.011 0.007 0.091 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 0.061 0.006 0.000 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.133 0.011 0.000 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 0.050 0.006 0.000 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.045 0.005 0.000 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.061 0.007 0.000 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.053 0.007 0.000 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.108 0.009 0.000 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.170 0.020 0.000 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.117 0.013 0.000 19/20
16. Tried other drugs 0.044 0.009 0.000 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 0.289 0.097 0.003 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
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of HA. In the case of the human capital outcomes, the ATETs estimated trough propensity
score matching are about half the size of those suggested by t-tests. Such a drop in the
estimated effect following the use of propensity score matching is not observed in the case of
risky behaviours and social ties (compare, for example, the results in table A.2 and A.5 for
outcomes 10 and 17). This suggests the negative effect of HA on risky behaviours and the
(small) positive effect on social ties is more likely to be causal than the one on education.
The results on risky behaviours are in line with our analysis of BCS data: they suggest risky
behaviours do take place when young people hang around. Moreover, HA is likely to affect
risky behaviours through peer effects, as vandalism, fights and drug initiation are more likely
to be group activities than studying. The results on social ties are also likely to be at least
partially causal, as spending time hanging around with friends may strengthen friendship ties.
Table A.6: Tests for Equality of Means for PA
Mean t-tests N. Observations
PA Non-PA Difference S.e. p-value PA Non-PA Age
Human capital
1. Homework 2.794 2.631 0.164 0.028 0.000 8408 4487 14/15
2. Reading 0.767 0.726 0.041 0.008 0.000 8546 4636 14/15
3. Applying to Higher Education 0.435 0.343 0.092 0.011 0.000 5836 3040 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 0.410 0.316 0.094 0.011 0.000 5831 3038 18/19
5. In Higher Education 0.378 0.303 0.076 0.011 0.000 5454 2838 20/21
6. In Russell group 0.093 0.048 0.044 0.006 0.000 5446 2832 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 0.085 0.120 -0.035 0.006 0.000 8190 4372 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.488 0.427 0.061 0.009 0.000 8117 4370 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 0.087 0.087 0.000 0.005 0.995 8330 4496 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.068 0.059 0.009 0.005 0.058 8393 4528 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.109 0.084 0.026 0.006 0.000 8269 4473 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.121 0.107 0.015 0.006 0.014 8293 4468 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.205 0.156 0.049 0.007 0.000 8263 4453 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.530 0.483 0.047 0.017 0.005 5456 2829 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.328 0.267 0.061 0.011 0.000 5405 2800 19/20
16. Tried other Drugs 0.112 0.090 0.023 0.007 0.002 5412 2802 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 5.817 4.903 0.914 0.078 0.000 5391 2793 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7.
We now look at the effects of purposeful activities (PA). Table A.6 compares the means
of the outcomes in table A.1 for those who take part in PA at wave one (PA respondents)
and those who do not take part in PA at wave one (non-PA respondents). PA is associated
with higher human capital accumulation. For example, compared to non-PA respondents, PA
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respondents spend around one fifth of an evening more doing homework at age 14/15 and are
8% more likely to be in Higher Education at age 20/21. The picture on risky behaviour is
more nuanced. At age 14/15, PA respondents are less likely to have tried cannabis, but are
more likely to have tried alcohol or to have been involved in graffiti, vandalising, shoplifting,
and fights. At age 19/20, PA respondents are more likely to have had unsafe sex, and tried
drugs (both cannabis and other drugs). Finally, at age 19/20 PA respondents have on average
almost one close friend more than non-PA respondents.
Again, the differences in table A.6 cannot be considered causal. The potential causal effect
of PA is unclear a priori. On the one hand, PA foster skills like grit, self-confidence, trust and
cooperation. These skills are likely to boost human capital accumulation and discourage risky
behaviours. On the other hand, PA subtract time to homework and reading and put young
people in contact with other people of the same age. Therefore, PA may interfere with human
capital accumulation and expose young people to peer effects encouraging risky behaviours.
Like with HA, we use propensity score matching to shed light on the causal effect of
PA.58 Figures A.10 and A.11, and tables A.7 and A.8 suggest the matching has successfully
achieved comparability between the treatment and the control group. Figure A.10 shows the
propensity scores for treated and controls have a large common support. Moreover, it shows
the distributions of the propensity score computed for treated and control observations are
initially quite different, but then become indistinguishable when re-weighed. Figure A.11
shows the standardised bias for the covariates is initially sizeable, but it dramatically reduces
after the matching. Finally, all measures for overall covariate imbalance are satisfactory (see
tables A.7 and A.8).
The ATETs for PA obtained via propensity score matching are shown in table A.9. The
results on human capital accumulation and social ties maintain the same sign -and roughly
the same size- as the t-tests in table A.6. For example, the ATETs suggest PA respondents are
likely to spend over one fifth of an evening doing homework more than non-PA respondents.
Moreover, PA respondents are 19% (almost seven p.p.) more likely to apply to university
than non-PA respondents at age 18/19, and 21% more likely (over six p.p.) to be in Higher
58The technique, and the variables used to estimate the propensity score are the same used for HA.
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Figure A.10: Propensity Scores for Treated and Controls Before and After Matching (PA)
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Note: The ‘Before’ graphs show the distribution of the propensity scores for the treated (black dashed line)
and the control observations (grey solid line) before the matching. The ‘After’ graphs show the distribution of
the propensity scores for the treated (black dashed line) and the control observations (grey solid line) where
the control observations within a certain radius from the treated have been weighted proportionally to the
inverse of their distance from the treated. Weights for the treated observations are equal to 1.
Education two years later. The ATETs for risky behaviours suggest at age 14/15 PA respon-
dents are 20% less likely (around 2 p.p.) to have tried cigarettes and cannabis, but also 30%
more likely (5 p.p.) to be involved in fights.59 For risky behaviours the ATETs suggest a more
59The result on fights may be partially due to the fact that LSYPE reports as fights also those occurred in
political rallies, and participating in political rallies is a component of PA.
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Table A.7: Propensity Score: Diagnostics, part one (PA)
R B
Before After Before After Age
Human capital
1. Homework 0.986 0.999 70.712 13.920 14/15
2. Reading 0.990 0.963 70.354 13.601 14/15
3. Applying to Higher Education 0.996 1.077 71.671 15.544 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 0.996 0.955 71.620 17.656 18/19
5. In Higher Education 0.995 1.114 70.210 17.223 20/21
6. In Russell group 0.996 0.816 70.439 17.447 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 0.964 0.846 71.008 14.453 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.984 1.025 70.756 13.213 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 0.980 1.047 70.424 12.904 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.984 0.926 70.398 12.879 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.983 1.065 70.670 14.605 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.981 1.206 70.271 13.749 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.978 1.102 70.568 14.528 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.992 0.936 70.517 18.301 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.994 1.085 70.751 17.448 19/20
16. Tried other Drugs 0.990 3.136 70.579 15.277 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 0.992 0.856 70.491 17.228 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
Table A.8: Propensity Score: Diagnostics, part two (PA)
Median bias Mean Bias Chi Prob R2
Before After Before After Before After Before After Age
Human capital
1. Homework 5.417 1.193 8.035 1.373 0.000 0.466 0.082 0.004 14/15
2. Reading 5.176 1.152 8.036 1.187 0.000 0.547 0.081 0.003 14/15
3. Applying to Higher Education 6.279 1.221 8.649 1.482 0.000 0.788 0.084 0.004 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 6.279 1.113 8.640 1.485 0.000 0.211 0.084 0.006 18/19
5. In Higher Education 6.429 1.390 8.533 1.480 0.000 0.482 0.081 0.005 20/21
6. In Russell group 6.479 1.408 8.564 1.606 0.000 0.409 0.081 0.006 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes 5.299 0.980 8.137 1.320 0.000 0.325 0.083 0.004 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 5.235 1.006 8.150 1.166 0.000 0.782 0.082 0.003 14/15
9. Tried cannabis 5.210 1.292 8.045 1.344 0.000 0.819 0.081 0.003 14/15
10. Done graffiti 5.033 1.201 8.034 1.254 0.000 0.812 0.081 0.003 14/15
11. Vandalised 5.186 1.291 8.097 1.433 0.000 0.279 0.082 0.004 14/15
12. Shoplifted 5.190 1.068 8.106 1.196 0.000 0.552 0.081 0.003 14/15
13. Involved in fights 5.409 1.067 8.033 1.314 0.000 0.304 0.082 0.004 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 6.529 1.435 8.549 1.691 0.000 0.187 0.081 0.006 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 6.393 1.603 8.579 1.697 0.000 0.437 0.082 0.006 19/20
16. Tried other Drugs 6.450 1.361 8.548 1.513 0.000 0.278 0.082 0.006 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 6.597 1.272 8.502 1.465 0.000 0.499 0.081 0.005 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
67
Table A.9: Propensity Score: Estimated ATET (PA)
ATET
Estimate s.e. p-value Age
Human capital
1. Homework 0.232 0.039 0.000 14/15
2. Reading 0.077 0.011 0.000 14/15
3. Applying to Higher Education 0.065 0.014 0.000 18/19
4. Offers from Higher Education 0.071 0.014 0.000 18/19
5. In Higher Education 0.064 0.015 0.000 20/21
6. In Russell group 0.026 0.009 0.003 20/21
Risky behaviours
7. Tried cigarettes -0.024 0.008 0.002 14/15
8. Tried alcohol 0.021 0.013 0.105 14/15
9. Tried cannabis -0.018 0.008 0.024 14/15
10. Done graffiti 0.006 0.006 0.289 14/15
11. Vandalised 0.010 0.008 0.190 14/15
12. Shoplifted 0.012 0.008 0.139 14/15
13. Involved in fights 0.046 0.009 0.000 14/15
14. Had unsafe sex 0.007 0.023 0.759 19/20
15. Tried cannabis 0.024 0.015 0.102 19/20
16. Tried other Drugs 0.017 0.010 0.081 19/20
Social ties
17. Number of close friends 0.629 0.108 0.000 19/20
Note: LSYPE waves 1, 5, 6, 7. ATET are estimated using the radiusmatch stata command (Huber et al.,
2012).
desirable effect of PA than the t-tests, as most of the positive signs estimated through t-tests
become zeros or turn negative when propensity scores are used.
In summary, we find PA are associated with -and possibly determine- higher human capital
accumulation and greater number of close friends in adulthood. The association between PA
and risky behaviours is less clear. Our analysis suggests PA participants are more likely to
select into risky behaviours, but the causal effect of PA may go in the opposite direction, and
PA may prevent young people from being involved in (at least some) risky behaviours.
Our findings on HA are entirely new, as no literature investigates this pervasive and policy
relevant behaviour. Our findings on PA are in line with the existing literature that generally
finds positive effects of PA on educational attainment (Long and Caudill, 1991; Barron et al.,
2000; Eide and Ronan, 2001; Lipscomb, 2007; Lechner, 2009; Pfeifer and Cornelißen, 2010; Rees
and Sabia, 2010; Stevenson, 2010; Felfe et al., 2016) but no effects on antisocial behaviours
(Felfe et al., 2016).60
60Negative effects of sport participation on crime are found by Caruso (2011), but the identification of the
effect only relies on regional variation for Italian regions.
68
The results in this appendix rest on the strong assumption of selection on observables, and
thus one needs to be cautious in claiming causality.61 However, our propensity score analysis is
not able to revert the initial conclusions based on raw data. We still conclude HA is negatively
associated with human capital accumulation and positively associated with risky behaviours.
In contrast, PA are positively associated with accumulation of human capital. This suggests
there is scope for economists to work on the identification, under weaker assumptions, of the
causal mechanisms linking HA and PA to these crucial outcomes. Also, this suggests the
importance of studying the determinants of HA and PA, as the body of the paper does.
A.4 Social Interaction and Preference for own Ethnic Group
In this section, we use LSYPE data to provide empirical support to our hypothesis that young
people prefer to interact with other young people from their own ethnic group. For each of the
main ethnic groups (White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African),
table A.10 reports: i) the share of that ethnic group in the sample (as the data are weighted,
this is an estimate of the share in the population); ii) information on the ethnicity of the
friends respondents from that ethnic group have at school; iii) information on the ethnicity of
the friends respondents from that ethnic group have outside school.62
Table A.10 suggests young people form ethnically homogeneous groups of friends and do
it by choice. Consider the case of Pakistanis (third panel from the top), who are around 2%
of the total. If friends’ ethnicity was random, Pakistanis should have around 2% of Pakistani
friends and thus report very few friends who are Pakistani themselves. However, 68.6% of
the Pakistanis say at least half of their friends at school are Pakistani. This percentage
reaches 79.12% in the case of friends outside school. This suggests groups of friends are more
homogeneous than if they were formed randomly. Table A.10 also shows friendship ties outside
61We are fairly confident about the robustness of our propensity score analysis for two reasons. First, our
propensity scores are based on a large set of variables. This reduces any unobservable effect potentially left
in the error term. Second, the selection on observables, which can be inferred by the difference between the
t-tests and the ATETs are tiny, and so is likely to be the selection on unobservables. This argument is based
on the assumption that the bias due to observables has the same sign as the bias due to unobservables, and
the latter is at most as important as the former (Altonji et al., 2005).
62The exact questions are: ‘How many of your friends at your school are (e.g., White)?’ and ‘How many of
your friends outside school are (e.g White)?’. The questions are asked at wave two. White British and other
Whites are not distinguished in wave two.
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Table A.10: Share of Friends from own Ethnic Group at School and Outside School
Ethnicity Percentage in LSYPE At school Outside school
White 86.57 All or most of them 66.61 72.07
More than half of them 23.86 19.30
About half 6.87 5.16
Less than half 1.47 1.62
Very few of them 0.72 0.82
None of them 0.15 0.34
No friends at school/outside 0.31 0.68
Indian 2.38 All or most of them 14.73 25.30
More than half of them 17.09 20.91
About half 20.71 17.41
Less than half 14.18 11.25
Very few of them 23.22 14.21
None of them 10.03 9.44
No friends at school/outside 0.00 1.48
Pakistani 2.37 All or most of them 28.25 40.99
More than half of them 20.26 20.60
About half 20.09 17.53
Less than half 11.02 9.64
Very few of them 14.49 6.44
None of them 5.89 3.47
No friends at school/outside 0.00 1.33
Bangladeshi 0.95 All or most of them 25.38 30.49
More than half of them 14.97 22.96
About half 16.84 17.09
Less than half 12.05 10.18
Very few of them 16.55 10.21
None of them 14.21 6.91
No friends at school/outside 0.00 2.15
Black Caribbean 1.43 All or most of them 16.97 23.81
More than half of them 21.20 27.17
About half 19.27 19.23
Less than half 19.45 13.96
Very few of them 17.31 11.96
None of them 5.81 3.32
No friends at school/outside 0.00 0.58
Black African 1.53 All or most of them 12.93 18.94
More than half of them 17.17 19.69
About half 19.50 24.67
Less than half 22.32 16.66
Very few of them 21.47 12.79
None of them 5.67 5.90
No friends at school/outside 0.34 1.36
Note: LSYPE wave 2, weighted data.
school are more ethnically homogeneous than those formed at school. While the ethnic mix of
friends from school is driven by the ethnic composition of the school catchment areas, friends
outside schools are more likely to be freely chosen. This suggests the ethnic homogeneity of
friendship groups is at least partially driven by preferences. If young people prefer to form
ethnically homogeneous groups, HA and PA are likely to be affected by district ethnic diversity
and segregation.
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Figure A.11: Standardised Bias for Covariates Before and After Matching (PA)
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Note: he grey dots indicate the bias in the covariates before the matching, the black ‘x’ signs indicate the
bias in the covariates after the matching. The bias after the matching is computed after weighting the control
observations using the inverse of their distance from the corresponding treated observation.
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B Appendix: Additional tables and figures
Figure B.1: Alien Act Port Towns and Population Growth
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Household Individual Location
Household income Male 0.510 Sun 183.840
Top quintile 0.170 (0.004) (0.332)
(0.003) Born in 1989 0.323 Rain 56.709
Second quintile 0.186 (0.004) (0.215)
(0.003) Ethnicity
Third quintile 0.230 White British 0.844
(0.004) (0.003)
Fourth quintile 0.196 Other Whites 0.018
(0.003) (0.001)
Top quintile 0.217 Indian 0.033
(0.003) (0.001)
English no mother tongue 0.029 Black Caribbean 0.030
(0.001) (0.001)
Female main parent 0.857 Other Mixed 0.020
(0.003) (0.001)
Mother’s education Black African 0.020
No education 0.197 (0.001)
(0.003) Pakistani 0.023
GCSE or below 0.415 (0.001)
(0.004) Bangladeshi 0.010
Above GCSE 0.247 (0.001)
(0.004) Chinese 0.004
Degree 0.092 (0.001)
(0.002)
Missing 0.048
(0.002)
Mother’s age
Below 35 0.002
(0.101)
35/49 0.796
(0.003)
Above 50 0.067
(0.002)
Missing 0.036
(0.002)
Mother’s employment status
Working full time 0.324
(0.004)
Working part time 0.356
(0.004)
Not working 0.283
(0.004)
Missing 0.038
(0.002)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Weighted data restricted to
the sample used in the estimates.
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Table B.2: First Stages (Just Identified). Coefficients of the Instruments.
Instrument Diversity Segregation
Proximity to the nearest port of entry 0.631* -0.399*
(0.289) (0.196)
Proximity to the nearest mill town -0.007 0.284***
(0.055) (0.082)
N 14,244 14,244
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Individual controls: Male, Born
in 1989, Ethnicity dummies. Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is
female, mother’s education, age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total
rainfall. Each LSYPE respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo
station in the interview month. Weighted data.
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Table B.4: IV1 First stages. Coefficients of the Instruments
Exogenous variable Diversity Segregation
Proximity to first port of entry -6.266 *** -3.334
(2.223) (2.131)
Proximity to first port of entry (squared) 88.342 *** 23.314
(21.757) (18.995)
Proximity to first port of entry (cubic) -193.354 *** -42.539
(46.826) (37.848)
Proximity to first mill town -6.282 14.889 ***
(5.160) (5.072)
Proximity to first mill town (squared) -0.020 6.813 **
(4.482) (3.333)
Proximity to first mill town (cubic) -0.125 -3.821 **
(2.353) (1.752)
Number of ports of entry in 20km 0.390 *** 0.123
(0.101) (0.091)
Number of ports of entry in 50km 0.018 -0.032
(0.026) (0.025)
Number of ports of entry in 100km -0.036 *** 0.007
(0.008) (0.009)
Number of mill towns in 20km -0.019 -0.012
(0.013) (0.017)
Number of mill towns in 50km 0.008 0.014 *
(0.007) (0.008)
Number of mill towns in 100km -0.004 ** 0.006 **
(0.002) (0.003)
Prox. to 1st port of entry*Num. of ports of entry in 20km -5.237 *** -0.932
(1.117) (1.092)
Prox. to 1st port of entry*Num. of ports of entry in 50km -1.590 *** 0.228
(0.274) (0.422)
Prox. to 1st port of entry*Num. of ports of entry in 100km 1.206 *** 0.097
(0.135) (0.148)
Prox. to 1st mill town*Num. of mill towns in 20km 0.067 0.130
(0.057) (0.095)
Prox. to 1st mill town*Num. of mill towns in 50km 0.080 -0.080
(0.122) (0.115)
Prox. to 1st mill town*Num. of mill towns in 100km 0.259 -0.900 ***
(0.274) (0.284)
N 14,244 14,244
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Weighted data.
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Table B.5: IV1 First stages. Other Coefficients
Exogenous variable Diversity Segregation
Hours of sun 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Rainfalls (mm) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Born in 1989 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Other Whites 0.078 *** 0.022 **
(0.016) (0.009)
Indian 0.109 *** 0.077 ***
(0.014) (0.011)
Black Caribbean 0.136 *** 0.058 ***
(0.015) (0.012)
Other Mixed 0.088 *** 0.044 ***
(0.015) (0.008)
Black African 0.108 *** 0.031 ***
(0.018) (0.010)
Pakistani 0.121 *** 0.109 ***
(0.019) (0.014)
Bangladeshi 0.122 *** 0.046 **
(0.020) (0.019)
Chinese 0.030 * 0.033 **
(0.017) (0.017)
Second Income quintile -0.005 * -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Third Income quintile -0.005 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Fourth Income quintile -0.018 *** -0.015 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Top Income quintile -0.009 ** -0.012 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
English no mother tongue 0.023 ** 0.011 **
(0.009) (0.006)
Female main parent -0.001 - 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s education: GCSE or below -0.010 *** -0.009 **
(0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s education: above GCSE -0.011 *** -0.012 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s education: degree -0.000 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Mother’s education: missing -0.003 -0.011
(0.010) (0.009)
Mother’s age: 35/49 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s age: 50plus -0.003 -0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
Mother’s age: missing -0.021 -0.005
(0.015) (0.014)
Mother’s employment status: part time -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s employment status: not working 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s employment status: missing 0.012 0.001
(0.017) (0.014)
Constant 0.276 *** 0.176 ***
(0.045) (0.051)
N 14,244 14,244
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Each LSYPE respondent is
assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the interview month. Reference
categories: female, born in 1990, White British, Bottom income quintile, mother tongue is English, mother
with no education, mother younger than 35 years old, mother works full time. Weighted data.
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Table B.6: IV2, IV3, IV4: Instruments Relevance and Exogeneity
IV2
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 48.356 0.003
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 629.842 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 1,316.944 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 25.346
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 25.077
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 54.228
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 29.068 0.218
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 20.520 0.667
IV3
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 64.063 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 592.760 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 2,018.274 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 37.591
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 18.980
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 64.624
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 29.478 0.493
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 38.982 0.126
IV4
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 71.546 0.024
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 67,974.672 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 32,542.763 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 1,972.006
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 1,347.634
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 6,434.231
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 50.388 0.418
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 50.925 0.396
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). Instruments IV2:
proximity to the closest and the second closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the squares),
number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest and
the second closed port and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Instruments IV3: distances from all
the ports of entry and Mill Towns. Instruments IV4: binary variables capturing the number of ports (mill
towns) within a 20, 50,100 kilometers radius.
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Table B.7: IV2, IV3, IV4: Second Stages.
IV2
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.065 * -0.040 -0.049 -0.039 -0.185 *** -0.278 *** -0.245 *** -0.278 ***
(0.036) (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) (0.067) (0.053) (0.067)
Segregation -0.001 0.164 * 0.113 0.166 * 0.199 *** 0.472 *** 0.467 *** 0.472 ***
(0.048) (0.091) (0.076) (0.091) (0.049) (0.086) (0.044) (0.086)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
IV3
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.065 * -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.185 *** -0.213 *** -0.192 *** -0.213 ***
(0.036) (0.053) (0.045) (0.053) (0.046) (0.066) (0.055) (0.066)
Segregation -0.001 0.116 * 0.096 0.117 * 0.199 *** 0.428 *** 0.414 *** 0.430 ***
(0.048) (0.084) (0.059) (0.084) (0.049) (0.071) (0.047) (0.071)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
IV4
PA HA
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.065 * -0.017 * -0.100 ** -0.108 * -0.185 *** -0.371 *** -0.373 *** -0.375 ***
(0.036) (0.062) (0.039) (0.063) (0.046) (0.085) (0.067) (0.087)
Segregation -0.001 0.027 * 0.013 0.028 * 0.199 *** 0.347 *** 0.362 *** 0.350 ***
(0.048) (0.075) (0.020) (0.076) (0.049) (0.074) (0.032) (0.075)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Results are computed using the
ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). ndividual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity dummies.
Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s education,
age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. Each LSYPE
respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the interview
month. Instruments IV2: proximity to the closest and the second closest port of entry and its higher terms
(up to the squares), number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity
to the closest and the second closed port and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Instruments IV3:
distances from all the ports of entry and Mill Towns. Instruments IV4: binary variables capturing the
number of ports (mill towns) within a 20, 50,100 kilometers radius. Weighted data.
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Table B.8: RS with IV1 Instruments: Instruments Relevance and Exogeneity
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 31.341 0.018
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 161.184 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 271.696 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 15.528
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 9.452
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 15.798
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 21.639 0.155
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 24.968 0.070
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). Instruments IV1:
proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the third), number of ports in a radius of
20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest port and the number of ports within
20, 50, 100km.
Table B.9: RS with county FE and IV1 Instruments: Instruments Relevance and Exogeneity
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 35.633 0.005
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 188.364 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 98.363 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 5.319
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 11.092
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 5.169
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 16.913 0.391
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 16.625 0.410
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). Instruments IV1:
proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the third), number of ports in a radius of
20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest port and the number of ports within
20, 50, 100km.
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Table B.10: Heteroskedasticity Constructed Instruments (I). Instruments Relevance and Exo-
geneity
Parsimonious Richer
Test Test statistics p-value Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 84.038 0.007 120.337 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 1049.95 0.000 4920.08 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 832.44 0.000 5065.84 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 15.71 47.89
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 18.92 66.53
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 15.00 68.50
Overidentification
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 54.899 0.440 74.136 0.408
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 71.907 0.052 81.190 0.215
Heteroskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan (Diversity) 851.82 0.000 37.61 0.000
Breusch-Pagan (Segregation) 76.03 0.000 26.84 0.000
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2h stata command by Baum and Schaffer (2012).
Table B.11: Heteroskedasticity Constructed Instruments (II). Instruments Relevance and Ex-
ogeneity
Richer with county FE
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 178.26 0.018
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 15872.68 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 25930.22 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 129.12
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 110.17
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 179.98
Overidentification
Sargan-Hansen (PA) 146.225 0.342
Sargan-Hansen (HA) 150.093 0.265
Heteroskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan (Diversity) 3.17 0.075
Breusch-Pagan (Segregation) 208.73 0.000
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2h stata command by Baum and Schaffer (2012).
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Table B.12: IV1: Second Stages for HC (Coefficients of Interest).
LPM 2SLS GMM LIML
Diversity -0.004 -0.048 -0.117 * -0.050
(0.046) (0.078) (0.068) (0.079)
Segregation -0.118 * -0.345 *** -0.405 *** -0.351 ***
(0.061) (0.120) (0.111) (0.123)
N 14,244 14,244 14,244 14,244
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Results are computed using the
ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). Individual controls: male, born in 1989, ethnicity dummies.
Family controls: income quintiles, English no mother tongue, main parent is female, mother’s education,
age and employment status. Weather controls: total sunshine duration, total rainfall. Each LSYPE
respondent is assigned the weather information collected from the closest meteo station in the interview
month. Instruments IV1: proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the third),
number of ports in a radius of 20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest port
and the number of ports within 20, 50, 100km. Weighted data.
Table B.13: HC with IV1 Instruments: Instruments relevance and exogeneity
Test Test statistics p-value
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap Ch-sq 41.396 0.001
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Diversity) 377.005 0.000
Sanderson-Windmeijer Ch-sq (Segregation) 2492.583 0.000
F tests
Kleibergen-Paap 28.507
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Diversity) 23.456
Sanderson-Windmeijer (Segregation) 147.868
Overidentification (2SLS)
Sargan-Hansen 19.553 0.241
Note: Tests are computed using the ivreg2 stata command by Baum et al (2002). Instruments IV1:
proximity to the closest port of entry and its higher terms (up to the third), number of ports in a radius of
20, 50, 100km, and interactions between the proximity to the closest port and the number of ports within
20, 50, 100km.
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. a) Call n¯g1 the number of Greens in ward 1 in the perfect integration scenario, where
D = 0. Call Dn the level of segregation obtained by moving n = 0, . . . n¯g1 Greens from ward
2 to ward 1, starting from the perfect integration scenario.
D1 > D0 given:
D1 =
1
2
(∣∣∣ n¯g1 + 1
Ng
− np1
Np
∣∣∣+∣∣∣ n¯g1 − 1
Ng
− np1
Np
∣∣∣) > 0 = D0 (13)
because n¯g1+1
Ng
6= np1
Np
and n¯g1−1
Ng
6= np1
Np
. In general Dn > Dn−1 ∀n
Dn =
1
2
[∣∣∣( n¯g1 + n
Ng
)
− np1
Np
∣∣∣+∣∣∣( n¯g1 − n
Ng
)
− np1
Np
∣∣∣] > (14)
1
2
[∣∣∣( n¯g1 + (n− 1)
Ng
)
− np1
Np
∣∣∣+∣∣∣( n¯g1 − (n− 1)
Ng
)
− np1
Np
∣∣∣] = Dn−1
because n¯g1+n
Ng
> n¯g1+(n−1)
Ng
> np1
Np
and n¯g1−n
Ng
< n¯g1−(n−1)
Ng
< np1
Np
. Notice that limn→n¯g1 Dn =
1
2
.
Given part a) holds, we can prove part b) by analysing the effect of an increase in district
ethnic segregation obtained when Greens are moved from ward 2 to 1. Consider the two
activities in isolation. The effect is weakly positive for HA and null for PA. The partial
derivatives of (1), (2), (7), (8), (5) and (6) with respect to ng1 are:
∂EUg1i(HA)
∂ng1
=
(1− τHA)np1
(ng1 + np1)2
≥ 0 Since 0 ≤ τHA ≤ 1 (15)
∂EUp1i(HA)
∂ng1
=
−(1− τHA)np1
(ng1 + np1)2
≤ 0 Since 0 ≤ τHA ≤ 1 (16)
∂EUg2i(HA)
∂ng1
=
−(1− τHA)ng1
(Ng − ng1 + np1)2 ≤ 0 Since 0 ≤ τHA ≤ 1 (17)
∂EUp2i(HA)
∂ng1
=
(1− τHA)ng1
(Ng − ng1 + np1)2 ≥ 0 Since 0 ≤ τHA ≤ 1 (18)
Greens in ward 1 and Purples in ward 2 have now increased incentives to do HA. Purples in
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ward 1 and Greens in ward 2 have now decreased incentives to do HA. As n¯g1 + n + np1 >
n¯g1 − n + np1, ∀n = 1, . . . , n¯g1 − 1, at the aggregate level, this translates into an increase in
the total incentives of doing HA. Since district ethnic diversity remains unaffected:
∂EUg1(PA)
∂ng1
=
∂EUg2(PA)
∂ng1
=
∂EUp1(PA)
∂ng1
=
∂EUp1(PA)
∂ng1
= 0 (19)
and thus the incentives of doing PA remain unaffected.
c) Assume now that young people can switch between activities. Notice that for n¯g1+n+np1
young people ∂EU(HA)
∂ng1
≥ ∂EU(PA)
∂ng1
, and for n¯g1 − n + np1 young people ∂EU(HA)∂ng1 ≤
∂EU(PA)
∂ng1
.
Since n¯g1 +n+np1 > n¯g1−n+np1, ∀n = 1, . . . , n¯g1− 1, more people have incentive to switch
from PA to HA.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. a) Notice that limNg→∞ F = 1−
( Ng
Ng+Np
)2 − ( Np
Ng+Np
)2
= 0.
b)-c). For a given Ng we need to find the values ng1 and ng2 that keep district ethnic
segregation equal to D¯ ∀Ng. Since ng2 = Ng − ng1, we need to find ng1 that solves:
D =
1
2
(∣∣∣ng1
Ng
− np1
Np
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Ng − ng1
Ng
− np1
Np
∣∣∣) = D¯ (20)
The two solutions of (20) are:
ng1 =
(
1
2
+ D¯
)
Ng and consequently ng2 =
(
1
2
− D¯
)
Ng (21)
ng1 =
(
1
2
− D¯
)
Ng and consequently ng2 =
(
1
2
+ D¯
)
Ng (22)
The results (21) and (22) are symmetric and thus we focus on (21) only, where ng1 ≥ ng2.
To study the effect of district ethnic diversity, we compute the derivative with respect to
Ng of the utility functions (1), (2), (7), (8), (5) and (6). By substituting the value of ng1
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obtained in (21), we get:
∂EUg1i(HA)
∂Ng
= −2(1 + 2D¯)(−1 + τHA)np1
(Ng + 2D¯Ng + 2np1)2
≥ 0 (23)
∂EUg2i(HA)
∂Ng
=
2(−1 + 2D¯)(−1 + τHA)np1
(Ng + 2D¯Ng + 2np1)2
≥ 0 ∀D¯ ≤ 1
2
(24)
∂EUp1i(HA)
∂Ng
=
2(1 + 2D¯)(−1 + τHA)np1
(Ng + 2D¯Ng + 2np1)2
≤ 0 (25)
∂EUp2i(HA)
∂Ng
= −2(−1 + 2D¯)(−1 + τHA)np1
(Ng + 2D¯Ng + 2np1)2
≤ 0 ∀D¯ ≤ 1
2
(26)
∂EUg1i(PA)
∂Ng
=
∂Ug2(PA)
∂Ng
= −2(−1 + τPA)np1
(Ng + 2np1)2
≥ 0 (27)
∂EUp1i(PA)
∂Np
=
∂Up2(PA)
∂Np
=
2(−1 + τPA)np1
(Ng + 2np1)2
≤ 0 (28)
(23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and (28) suggest that, for a given level of district ethnic segre-
gation D¯, when district ethnic diversity decreases, the expected utility of both HA and PA
derived by the Greens increases, while the expected utility of both HA and PA derived by
the Purples decreases. As the Greens are the majority (Ng > Np), at the aggregate level, a
decrease in district ethnic diversity increases both the incentives of doing HA and the incen-
tives of doing PA. The magnitude of such increases depends on the magnitude of τHA and
τPA. Consider Greens in ward 1, the largest group. Call ∆τ = τPA − τHA. If ∆τ ≤ 0,
∂EUg1i(HA)
∂Ng
<
∂EUg1i(PA)
∂Ng
∀D > 0 and ∀Ng. To see what happens when ∆τ > 0, we compute the
limit of
∂EUg1i(PA)
∂Ng
and
∂EUg1i(HA)
∂Ng
when τPA approaches 1 and τHA approaches 0, respectively.
These are limτPA→1
∂EUg1i(PA)
∂Ng
= 0 and limτHA→0
∂EUg1i(HA)
∂Ng
= 2(1+2D¯)np1
(Ng+2D¯Ng+2np1)2
≥ 0. Therefore,
∃∆¯g1τ(τHA, τPA) > 0 : if ∆τ > ∆¯g1τ(τHA, τPA) then ∂EUg1i(HA)∂Ng >
∂EUg1i(PA)
∂Ng
∀D,Ng. As a
consequence, at the aggregate level, ∃∆¯τ(τHA, τPA) > 0 : if ∆τ > ∆¯τ(τHA, τPA) the incentives
of HA increase more than the incentives of PA.
.
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